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FOREWORD 
Industrial accidents represent a high cost on the social economy. They represent a 
threat to workers physical integrity and their safety. Moreover, companies are 
responsible for the cost of damages incurred due to accidents and accident prevention. 
In 1997, INAIL (italian institute for the insurance against on-the-job injuries) registered a 
total of 1,249 fatal injuries. In 1951 fatal injuries registered were 2,328, taking into 
consideration all job activities in the whole country .  
As far as job injuries are concerned, 2010 is considered as an year of improvement. In 
fact, in 2009 injuries have decreased by almost 10%. 
In 2010, INAIL reported 775 thousands injuries, with an increase of 1.9%: 980 fatal 
injuries, decreased by 6,9% (equal to 1.053) over the year. Year 2010 also faced a 
decrease of 0.7% on employment (data registered by ISTAT, National Institute of 
Statistics). 
Figure 1: Percentage of injuries on the period 
2001-2010 - ACTIVITIES 
Numbers (2001 = 100) 
 
But as indicated above these, does not necessarily reflect future performance or a 
decline in accidents at work in all the activities, as the statistical data to represent a real 
situation must be founded on basic principles such as: 
The statistical data  should be carefully understood: 
Possible misuses and misleading of statistical data:  
 inference of the effectiveness of safety audits 
 forecasting of expectable accident rates 
 
what did it happen? 
The disappointing result is three 
possible sets of errors: 
1 – reduced statistical basis (region or 
even province, without due 
consideration of the local industrial 
situation) 
2 – insufficient analysis of boundary 
data (e.g. economical situation)  
3 – yearly data instead of packaged 
mean values on 3 or more years 
some precious info for an effective 
prevention can however be obtained on 
special circumstances (e.g. in case of 
technological modifications) 
Therefore, in this case the statistics analyses on hand do not have to be considered a 
real and complete representation of the working panorama, in fact the INAIL data are 
underestimated, as they are excluded by the calculation the work of the books, the 
irregular foreign workers, victims of accident while travelling from home to the 
workplace and youth dead are not considered in those categories that do not depend on 
INAIL management. Regarding the occupational diseases, it’s enough to compare the 
official figures with, for example, the three thousand dead, mostly former workers or ex 
former workers, caused by the asbestos, to realize the real chasm that divides the 
counting of the agency from the dramatic truth of all days. 
The relative decrease of the number of the work’s accidents is due moreover to the 
crisis’ effects that has led to the closure of thousands of companies, that has emptied 
the factories and the places of work and that has raised one hand illegal employment, 
and on the other side workers on redundancy payment, the workers in mobility, the 
young people without job and the unemployed. So, regular occupation is diminished 
and, consequently, officially figures reported killed and injured on the job are dropped 
in proportion smaller. It is always found to us therefore in front of a decrease that 
probably is in relative terms less marked than that appearing, granted that a decrease 
effectively has happened. 
The trend of work’s accidents follows, therefore, step by step the transformations of the 
labor market in these last decades. 
There is no doubt that the greater problems are where the workers organizations are 
weakened, where are systematically eroded the rights and practiced the most odious 
forms of blackmail, pressure, threat and division of labor. 
Both the amount and the jobs dynamics (risk exposure) are the best criteria used on the 
job injury phenomenon within the country. In fact, this criteria allows to bring the 
injuries  from an absolute value to a relative value. In order to obtain the right 
evaluation, an index between the number of injuries and the total of workers (provided 
by ISTAT) must be considered. 
By analyzing this data a minor number of injuries is caused by a lack of safety of both 
plant and machinery. Although there is an increase of injuries caused by a lack of 
organization and right procedure, such as maintenance, transport, etc.  
The main goal of this research is to create a useful method of accidents prevention in 
the workplace: a software that analyzes accidents would lead to a better understanding 
of the injuries causes.  
INTRODUCTION 
Industrial accidents is not necessarily a result of misfortune and the decrease of 
accidents is not a result of fortune. In fact, it is the result of a long, determined and 
smart effort of a large group of workers together with a smaller group of technicians, 
trade-unionists, entrepreneurs, researchers, public officers and magistrates.  
Figure 1 shows the monument to 48 people (out of a total 4.000) who died after on-the-
job-accidents during the construction of the Frejus railway tunnel (1857-1871). Time has 
changed and people suffering injuries while working in mountainous areas is not 
considered just fate anymore. Today assuring  prevention and preserving safety and 
health of both workers and environment is mandatory.  
 Figure 2: monument to the  workers who 
contributed to the construction of the Rail Tunnel 
Frejus, Tourin (1879). Project by Luigi Belli – 
picture by K.Weise  
Prevention is basic. Preventing job injuries is a social goal with a multitude of benefits of 
short, medium and long term. Besides being ethically correct, it is also a way to save, as 
an injury can lead to death (in the worst scenario) or to a permanent inability to work 
that is a high social cost directly paid by the worker with his health. On top of this, the 
whole country needs to face an economical cost for every person injured (e.g. 800000 
injuries cost approx. 32billion euros, roughly 2% of the GNP). 
Every small contribution to reduce the causes of accidents must be considered. 
Prevention is the connection of connect various complementary activities such as: the 
regulation and standardization of work environments, devices, machinery, tools, 
equipment, the inspection and supervision from the safety, the information, formation 
and training on actual risks on work sites. It is important to create and execute programs 
of prevention focused on the specific job research and development. This goal can be 
reached by Prevention through Design as a virtuous system of conception and actuation 
of the project.  
This approach has some limits: 
 the quality and complete enforcement of the updated regulations, on T.L.V., etc., 
as general values such as the 5 commandment you shall not murder – are not 
sufficient for the engineering- technology; 
 scenarios not defined by technical laws cannot be directly taken into 
consideration. Only in few cases it can be taken into consideration, such as the 
fine technical-analytical interferences as method of analysis of functional 
volumes (Pinzari, 2001) and of computerized simulations of the operational 
phases (Bersano et al., 2009); 
 the management of Residual Risk requires specific in depth analysis in order to 
take into consideration the technical and organizational progress, new materials 
and substances, etc..  
Appling the right use of the proposed technique, particularly in the phase of 
identification of the causes of hazard is basic. Moreover, it is also important a deep 
knowledge of the causes (initiating events) which are at the origin of injuries. Indeed it is 
difficult to follow this procedure and no database on injuries developed for statistic 
purposes is enough. Today in many industrial situations the chain of connected events is 
so complex that the most serious problems can result hidden at  fist sight. In fact, the 
available statistics do not guarantee a deep analysis on the investigation. The 
contemporary methods of elaboration of data, based on fuzzy logic approaches and 
neural nets (Demichela et al., 2009, 2011), need to extended cases that are not always 
available when focusing on the analysis of specific work areas (e.g. the subgroup of the 
activities within a construction site made of the underground job. Obviously, the 
analysis of a set of non-homogeneous or incomplete data can only lead to partial 
results, as strengthened by many Authors (NOHSC, 2004), the problems due to the 
significant consistency of the database, the correct use of the stored data, and the 
difficulties in the evaluation of the main internal and external parameters being 
unfortunately often underestimated, this leading to omitted or ineffective Risk 
Management actions, poor Residual Risk Management, and inefficient use of the 
national inspection resources (typically where flimsy subsets of national data are 
arbitrarily used for local policy), as discussed in (Ariano et al., 2009). 
OBJECTIVES 
Quantitative and qualitative study of occupational accident events is useful both 
because it can contribute to the choices of priorities and lines of action, both because it 
can assess the results and measures and the means put in place preventive purposes. 
What is, however, the starting point for a proper analysis of an injury? Where should we 
stop? What level of depth of the event’s dynamics have? 
Injury is a complex phenomenon to be addressed as they enter in different games 
parameters, see the place where the event happened, the location and nature of injury, 
the dynamics of the event. 
So in dealing with the analysis of the accident causes in order to highlight initiating 
events, the first aim to ask it is the absolute necessity of objectivity: one of the typical 
accidents where you may incur is the tendency to focus mainly on possible behavioural 
deviations, such as dangerous actions, errors or violation of security procedures by 
victims or their colleagues. 
Consistency, completeness and objectivity of post-event survey constraints, the 
development of an appropriate operational Protocol, as in General in the various 
processes of safety analysis. 
The Operating Protocol post-event survey developed in this research may therefore 
constitute a useful reference for the refinement of risk assessment and management, 
also because it will make possible a discussion about intermediate and initiators events 
that have originated the result, apart from the need to hire as only reference statistical 
data published and then freeing the analyst from the issues invoked; also shall be able 
to be used as a preventive tool in the identification of the actions necessary to eliminate 
or where it is not possible to minimize the risk exposure of workers. 
Steps developed 
The research consists of several sections: 
1. First introduces the topic and goals.  
2. In the second part, is succinctly explained, as far as possible, the methods 
and models of analysis developed to date, with the aim of contributing to the 
prevention of work’s accidents, focusing on the distinction of the problems 
that characterize the identified approaches and discussing the contribution 
to the analysis of accidents and to improve the conditions of safety at work 
and then I'll discuss what these different methods converge. 
3. Third part focuses on the explanation of the technique of analysis prepared 
on the basis of the old study and analysis approaches and theories of 
elaborate analysis until nowadays. In the final part is offered an overview of 
actual accident events to which is applied the software worked. 
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SAFETY AT WORK: THE APPLICATION OF LAWS AND TECHNICAL 
REGULATIONS  
The introduction of Safety concept in terms of Prevention (all the provisions or 
measures necessary according to the particularity of the work, experience and 
technique, to prevent or reduce occupational risks) in the workplace, find in 4 
cornerstones of national legislation basis: 
 Italian Constitution - art. 41: "private economic initiative is free. Cannot be in 
contradiction with the social utility or to harm the safety, freedom, human 
dignity ..";  
 art. 2087 of the Civil Code: "the entrepreneur is obliged to adopt in the 
course of measures that, according to the particularity of the work, 
experience and technology, are necessary to protect the physical integrity 
and the moral personality of providers of work"; 
 art 437, Malicious removing or omission of precautions against accidents at 
work and articles 589 and 590, respectively on manslaughter and culpably 
caused personal injuries of the Penal Code; 
 Statute of workers n° 300 – art. 9: "workers through their representatives, 
have the right to monitor the implementation of standards for the 
prevention of accidents and occupational diseases and to promote research, 
development and implementation of all appropriate measures to protect 
their health and their physical integrity (art. 2087 C.C.). 
The concept of " safe work” depends essentially on two factors: 
 Technical progress: switching from mechanized production cycle in that 
automated. The breakdown of work involves the repetition of actions carried 
out by the worker. The change in pace of work causes consequences on 
workers such as estrangement, anonymity, anxiety, lack of motivation ... 
which increase the risk of injuries and/or illnesses 
 Development of labour relations:  
o until the 50 's "the injury is a price to be paid to the social and 
economic growth of the country"; 
o during the years 1950-1970 is a conscience "prevention" whose goal 
is the "safety in the work; 
o risk mapping for each production department is based on the 
experience of the laundry workers. 
From Protection to Prevention in order to eliminate work related accidents 
In the Italian legislation on safety has a considerable evolution in approach. It has 
been left from a model of accidents prevention at work and occupational diseases, 
where the beginning until about the second half of the 50s, the health of workers 
constituted a dependent variable of the production process and work-related 
accidents and illnesses were considered a price to pay for industrial development.  
Afterwards the prevention concept has assumed a new role, where in the first place 
is put safety and health of employees and the identification of a general duty of 
prevention and safety, which belongs to the employer. 
DPR 547/55, 164/56 and 303/56 are the first organic normative witnesses in matter 
of accidents prevention and occupational hygiene, and are an important first 
answer, though marked by political and socio-economic conditions of the moment.  
The first interventions in the safety world were the introduction of protective 
systems, such as the outside of the machine to prevent contact of the worker with 
the moving and the dangerous parts of machinery, that of the "individual safety 
devices" in order to guarantee a barrier that ensured the safety worker. 
The adopted solution, however, turned out to be not sufficient in order to assure the 
concrete fine to prevent accidents effectively.  
Around the years 90, thanks to the fact that the European market demanded a 
unitary concept of safety, were issued directives that have gradually designed a 
system according to which the danger to safety and health workers depended not 
only by the lack of protections "objective" of the machines, as the manner of their 
use in the workplace. It was born and took increasingly popular the thought that 
safety was derived from the analysis and dynamic knowledge of the production 
process, which could be acquired only by defining the necessary procedures and 
coherent organizational solutions with the aim, returning them mandatory.  
The bench marks of prevention theory were: 
 information formation and training of individuals in the workplace;  
 the participation of workers in the organized process of prevention;  
The directives, that were born on the basis of this approach, become operational as 
the result of publication on the Official Gazette of the Community, and shall include 
a commitment to transpose into national law by each Member State within a 
predetermined period of time (1) and are:  
A) Directive 89/391 - June 12, 1989: "A minimum requirements for improving the 
protection of the safety and health of workers," discipline is a general matter, albeit 
within the minimum limits, which with its 13 directives "daughters "* To: D. Decree 
81/08, as amended. (T.U. security); 
 
B) Directive 89/392 - June 14, 1989 : "approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to machinery" and subsequent additions (currently the 89/392 
'replaced by 06/42 EU) "* Presidential Decree 459 of 24 July 1996; 
 
                                                             
1 That is, in particular as regards the rules of a technical nature - "self-executing" - the principle that the 
Community directives after the expiration of the term in vain for their transposition by Member 
States, however, are directly involved in national law, in virtue of what was stated by the Court of Justice of 
the Union and by the Constitutional Court (see eg. judgment 8 to 18 April 1991. 1 OJ special edition, # 17, 
04.24.1991). 
The scenario for the worker 
The view, which arises from the application of safety normative, see the operator 
subject to a number of parameters which, if taken in excessive doses, can carry to 
situations industrial accident researches, sometimes not recoverable. 
 
If the resulting work load 
A + B + C + D + E +… … 
is excessive (2), there is the hazard of: 
instantaneous trauma, i.e. accident;  
middle or long term psychophysical 
decay, i.e. work-related disease.  
Despite the application of the "Prevention", the workplace can result in the 
accidental event and according to some logic, for being able to eliminate it the focus 
should be brought on the factors that characterize the workplace and the activities 
carried out in it, but first you need to understand what are the consequences which 
are to be made a thorough analysis. 
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The accident event and evolution of the accident analysis for prevention 
purposes  
Injury: injurious event to workers, that occurred for violent cause at work and from 
which is derived the death or permanent incapacity to work, absolute or partial, or total 
temporary disability resulting in an absence from work for more than three days (art. 2, 
DPR 1124/65).  
Accident: sudden and unexpected negative event that alters the normal pattern of work 
and determines damage to equipment and fittings.  
                                                             
2  sometimes the resulting work load  can be heavier than the one expected from a direct sum of the different 
contributions, e.g. when some parameters interact (such as  cold and hand-arm vibrations), du the synergic effect 
[sinergismi = an action where the total effect of two active causes is greater than the sum of their individual effects]. 
Near Miss: events, failures or adverse circumstances in any event that could lead to an 
accident or injury.  
Deviation: variation of process parameters from the operation optimal values - in the 
concepts are included Human Error (3), and human error of J.Reason (Reason, 2000) 
approach on the system:  
Table 1: Approaches that can be adopted with reference to human errors according  to J.Reason 
Approach  Consisting Consequence 
On the 
person 
It considers the occurrence of 
adverse events exclusive 
responsibility of individuals, and 
consequently of their mistakes (or 
the failure to comply with 
procedures that you do not call 
into question the quality) is 
certainly easy, simple and 
convenient. 
It focus on the individual errors 
(perhaps even victims of the 
deviation, as with non-zero 
contact factor functionally with 
unwanted energy) prevents / 
authorizes to avoid the 
observation of the context in 
which the errors occurred. 
On the 
system 
Worker’s errors are considered a 
consequence and not a cause of 
the deviation, deriving this, and 
often the same failures of 
individuals, free from defects 
upstream: in case of deviation 
must seek what went wrong in the 
system and organization, and who 
was wrong . 
counter measures can be taken 
to prevent or mitigate the 
consequences of the causes of 
the individuals errors, properly 
structuring systems and 
organization. Correct 
information campaigns, training, 
drills are basic (Patrucco, 2003). 
The evolution of interest in the accident 
Early theories of accidents emerged around the beginning of 900, when the accident 
at work was considered as an event dependent on supernatural forces against which 
no preventative measure could provide an effective solution, a divine action, a 
fatality.  
Such theory, however, lost almost quickly foundation, in order to under 
consideration leave space to the interest and to the study in the analysis of 
accidents of injured worker most of the injury. Caught on a gradually increasing 
interest for the "Human Factor" (Baudot de Nève, 1975; Surry,1971; Turbiaux, 
1970/71), which gave rise to the development of two major schools of thought: 
a) the individual predisposition (CCHST, 1980; Hale & Grendon, 1987): it is a 
definitive and stable predisposition – it means that the event is consequence of 
the human nature characteristics (its in the individual) that make in the course of 
life, the most vulnerable regardless of the work performed, as the sense of self-
punishment (4), unhappiness (5),stress from adaptation (6)(Kerr, 1950), but also 
                                                             
3 in full agreement with the approaches "healthy" of Behaviour-Based Safety, namely those that refer to situations 
characterized by the level of expected frequency of occurrence 
4 Psychoanalytic theories of Hale and Glendon 1987: "The injury was an unconscious act of self-punishment related to 
the worker's desire to escape from personal conflicts or even the need to escape from work or challenge the 
authority" - from which the injuries are the result of unconscious processes related to feelings of guilt, aggression, 
anxiety, ambition and conflict. 
5 The hypothesis of the escape of Hill and Trist, "people unhappy at work have a tendency to get away from invoking 
different reasons" - the injury becomes a means for the individual to withdraw from their work situation as an escape. 
the set of all these aspects considered like Cards of Domino (7)(Heinrich, 1931). 
The solution for the accident elimination involves a targeted selection to 
recognize and eliminate from the assumption susceptible individuals damaging 
event. 
b) the susceptibility to get injured is a predisposition linked to characteristics 
convertible with the experience and through the social environment - is based 
on the plasticity of human characteristics that need to be modelled through 
training; it focus on the traits, personality and individual attitudes that are 
acquired. Some members of this thinking are Hale & Hale (8)(Hale & Hale, 1980), 
according to which the choice of action to be influenced by several variables 
such as individual mental and physical abilities, the benefits (cost / benefit) of 
the different possible actions once they have been identified and the formation 
of individual attitudes. The worker and the situation interact at all stages of the 
process in such a way that the action taken as a result of the processing of 
information, in turn, change the job situation and the perception that the 
individual has. It also introduced a distinction between: 
a. primary factor of injury: crack in one of the stages of the treatment process 
information;  
b. secondary factors: they have the ability to influence one or more stages of the 
treatment process information; variables are associated with mental and 
physical, perceptual or coordination. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6 Kerr, 1950: "Individuals who are unable to adapt to the work environment will tend to have more accidents than 
others to cause physical and psychological stress." 
7 Industrial Accident Prevention of Heinrich, 1931/1980 
 
8 Hale & Hale, 1970: the injury is a deficiency on the part of the individual to adequately meet the actual situation 
that presents itself. The reasons for this inadequacy are searchable in the individual, in his environment, or both 
components 
 
Figure 3: Model of Hale & Hale - accident causation 
In developing this model Hale & Hale have pursued four objectives:  
1. insert the idea of accident proneness in an analytical framework 
where all the factors that may contribute to the genesis of the 
accident find their place;  
2. take into account that an injury can have multiple causes;  
3. reconcile their theoretical approach to safety with the 
practical;introdurre la distinzione fra infortunio e lesione 
According to the model’s creators, it can come to the classification of the degree 
of injury depending to the stage of the process to the whose inside has 
happened the error and this would afford the formulation of clearer hypotheses 
for the resolution on the stage.  
Other members are Corlett & Gilbank (9)(Corlett & Gilbank, 1978):  
This model is based on the Hale and Hale thought  further with the introduction 
of new variables such as stress and physical characteristics of the injured. 
 
                                                             
9 Corlett & Gilbank, 1978 consider the Hale & Hale inadequacy and they rewrite it introducing the concept of the 
planning and accommodation of work place in order to pursue the two fold objective of the efficiency and the safety 
 
Figure 4: Schematic of analysis of Corlett Gilbank 
To warning of the creators’ thought, injury derives from an individual inadequate 
answer compared to the actual needs of a situation, such inadequacy can come 
gives: 
 environmental layout; 
 temporary individual factors (age, job experience, …); 
 the effects of the immediate situation. 
Basically what all the supporters of these models propose is that the main emphasis 
come on unsafe acts and injury based on personal damages. People are seen like 
free acting, able to choose between safe and dangerous behaviours. The unsafe acts 
are generally intended like coming from the mental processes irregular: 
forgetfulness, inattention, distraction, worry, carelessness, low motivation, gross 
negligence or recklessness. 
The main countermeasures adopted by these models had to correct the attitudinal 
and cognitive individual processes, which are considered the main causes of unsafe 
acts. These include campaigns aimed at appealing to fear, rewards and punishments, 
the unsafe acts verification, the writing of additional procedures, retraining, 
renaming and humiliation. In this case, in order to achieve the complete injury 
elimination, it can be run also on research focused on the social aspects of the 
environment. 
The systematic approach 
The evolution and the practical one therefore are carried to consider incomplete 
and ineffective: 
 theories of preparation that have never succeeded to demonstrate the 
direct connection of the liability related to the accident with the specific 
characteristics of people, but many other factors (Saas e Cook, 1981) 
probably mediate and influence the link between personality and 
propensity to commit accidents. They also make it impossible to draw up 
a perspective of global analysis of the injury, as well as not considering 
the possible interactions between human and machine; 
 theories of susceptibility to get injured, which recognizes the distinction 
between the risk for the general framework within which the work is 
organized and carried out, and the risk to the individual operating within 
a specific work situation, but limited analysis in terms of presence / 
absence of an objective danger and essentially with respect to the 
specific work process. 
Therefore is developed a new approach, which assumes that the operation of a 
system  is the resulting from mutual interactions between man, machine and the 
environment, and not just the sum of its individual parts. 
The man-machine system is an entity in its own right, the machine is associated 
with the workplace and, in combination with the man, form a single organized 
whole (Cazamian e coll., 1974). The natural elements, technical and human who 
compose this set are arranged mutually interconnected and interdependent, and 
the modification of one of them causes the reorganization of the whole and acts 
on all the elements present. 
When one of system’s elements stop to carry out the function that is attributed 
it, injury occurs. The injury is defined in this system as an index of dysfunction of 
the same, and every accident is similar to an injury, although not necessarily 
cause harm to people (Faverge, 1974). The essence of this approach is based on 
the fact that the front-line operators are not accident’s activators, but rather 
become the heirs of latent conditions (or resident pathogens) that may have 
accumulated over a long time earlier, in these terms have been developed: 
 sequential models on the accidents: 
o the Domino model the genesis of the accidents of Heinrich 
(Heinrich, 1931): it conceives the genesis of an accident as an 
event that ties him to the other in a linear scheme or it identifies 
more simply a chain of the accidents, in which the single rings tie 
him up to determine the adverse event. So in terms of prevention 
it is necessary to break the chain of errors (or of events) to avoid 
to reach the injury. The limits of such model are to found on 
events defined in not objective way. 
o the model of the evolution and the barriers of the accident of 
Seveson (Seveson, 2001): 
it is a method for analysis of incidents and accidents that models 
the evolution towards an incident/accident as a series of 
interactions between human and technical systems. The 
interaction consists of failures, malfunctions or errors that could 
lead to or have resulted in an accident. The method forces 
analysts to integrate human and technical systems simultaneously 
when performing an accident analysis starting with the simple 
flow chart technique of the method.  
 
Figure 4: Scheme of AEB analysis (Accident analysis and barrier function) 
In general, the sequence of error boxes in the diagram follows the 
time order of events. Between each pair of successive error boxes 
there is a possibility to arrest the evolution towards an 
incident/accident.  
Barrier function systems (e.g., computer programs) that are 
activated can arrest the evolution through effective barrier 
functions (e.g., the computer making an incorrect human 
intervention modeled in the next error box impossible through 
blocking a control). 
An AEB analysis consists of two main phases: 
1. Modeling of the accident evolution in a flow diagram 
based on a preprinted or computer based flow chart.  
2. barrier function analysis: barrier functions are identified 
(ineffective and/or non existent), which could have 
arrested the unwanted evolution.  
The AEB method provides a common theoretical framework that 
is useful for communication and improvements of complex 
systems. It is important to stress that it presupposes a 
simultaneous analysis of both human factors and technical 
systems by experts from both fields interacting when performing 
the analysis. 
o the structure of the injury’s anatomy of Green A.E. (Green A.E., 
1988) : it involves a series of multiple sequences of events - 
diagram 3 leaks - in which individualizes the existence of some 
initial rootcause (every element of the chain of the events has 
his/her own precursors). 
 Epidemiological models of injuries: 
o The model of the “Swiss Cheese” (Reason J.,1997):   
The analogy resides in the discourse of the problem as the yield of 
the interaction of various factors, some obvious potentially, other 
latent ones. In fact the model shows as the defenses can be 
bypassed from accidentally trajectories due to breakdowns and 
latent conditions of the system 
 
Figure 5: the model of the “Swiss Cheese” (Reason J.), 2000 
Every slice - like Hemmental - has holes; but with the exception of 
the cheese, these holes are in continuous movement, moving 
themselves  from one place to another, opening and closing 
themselves. Only when verification the alignment of a series of 
holes, and injury trajectory can pass through defenses and cause 
damage to the people, to resources and to the environment. The 
holes are generated by unsafe acts (usually short-lived windows 
of opportunity) and by latent factors (are created as the planners 
do not visualize possible accident scenarios). 
o Analysis post-accident models based on FTA (Fault tree analysis 
(10)) aim to collect the information that afford for a structural 
analysis of the injury, or that they are considered the most likely 
causes, and many of them are placed inside the tree on several 
levels with logical connections and historical reports. 
 
Figure 6: FTA analysis 
The technique, commonly known as "fault tree", is founds him on 
a graphical construction that provides the systematic description 
of the combinations of possible events that can produce an 
undesirable outcome. The tree is built with the identification of 
events that are necessary for the occurrence of the TOP EVENT 
and those necessary for the later levels, up to the basic events.  
The basic events can be identified failures that require the 
resolvable temporary breakdowns easily. In any case, faults can 
be divided into: 
o primary, when the component is in operation within the limits 
(pressure, temperature, ...) declared by the manufacturer; 
these failures can be attributed to a defect of the component;  
o secondary, when the component, for any reason, is operating 
outside of the limits of the design;  
o of control, while the component can correctly work the 
control device is activated when it is not necessary or not 
active when it is.  From the graphical representation the 
analysis’ results are deduced, they are identified MCS 
(minimal cut sets), identifying their significance and 
recommendations on possible improvements. 
Despite the systemic models , at first sight, represent the most appropriate 
way to consider the causality of accidents in terms of understanding the 
                                                             
10 Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a technique developed to determine the possible sources of error within a system and 
which provides a model in the form of graphic representation and logic of the possible combinations of events that 
they can happen inside system and lead to another undesirable event. In this thought the near misses, accidents and 
material damage they receive are considered and analyzed in the same way, they are considered as the products of 
man-machine system, or in a more general sense, the socio-technical system (Leplat 1982). 
factors contributing and their corrective implications, also they have several 
disadvantages . In fact, systemic approach opens from a side new horizons to 
the studies and the accidents prevention at work, but on the other hand it 
involves disadvantages how the hierarchy of job rigidities or sources of 
perturbation in the determination of accident risks . They don’t allow to 
specify how each of these, identified once and individually taken, contributes 
to the probability of the occurrence of a deviation and the interactions that 
such approaches put in evidence they are certainly useful to help to 
individualize suitable measures and means of prevention to different work 
situations but this is not enough to establish the priority choices of 
intervention founded on the severity of the risk factors associated with the 
observed (Tort, 1974; Leplat, 1984). 
The evolution of systematic approach towards today’s energy and 
sequential models 
Nowadays, injuries and their prevention have led to the development of 
different theories of analysis, each with a force point but none quite complete.  
The process of analysis generally involves these steps: 
1. In response to an injury, has started a complaint practice of INAIL, whose 
authority if it deems it necessary, open a practice where it authorizes 
documents and place, that are connected with the injury, inspection in 
order to arrive at a clear and complete in-depth analysis of the accident; 
2. the analysis, which comes to the insurer, reaches this level of depth: 
Objective causes 
[Causal Factor]: 
Direct relationship injury-event: for example, "struck 
in the head by ..... "; 
worker 
age and experience 
  
Table 2:Report on the seniority of the worker to the job 
(Statistics for the prevention, POS - www.inail.it) 
job or workplace 
  
Table 3: Accidents at work occurred in the period 
2009/2011 and compensated at all for 31/03/201 type of 
physical activity and specific event year (Statistics for the 
prevention, POS-www.inail.it) 
Lesion site 
  
Table 4: Accidents at work occurred in the period 2011 and 
compensated at all for 31/03/2012 site of the lesion and the 
type of result (Statistics for the prevention, POS - 
www.inail.it) 
Nature of the 
lesion 
Table 5: Accidents at work occurred in the period 2011 and 
compensated at all for 31/03/2012 nature of the injury and 
the type of result (Statistics for the prevention, POS - 
www.inail.it) 
effect (severity of 
consequence) 
 
Table 6: Infortuni sul lavoro avvenuti nel periodo 
2007/2011 e indennizzati a tutto il 31/03/2012 
month, day and 
time of the event 
 Table 7: Accidents at work occurred in the period 2011 and 
compensated at all 31/03/2012 
3. INAIL, in the case of judicial expertise, is accompanied by experts or 
technical consultants, who are asked by judges and lawyers to perform a 
thorough analysis of the case, highlighting reasons for which the event 
occurred. In addition to these figures, the same analysis on behalf of the 
Employer can be carried out by specialists in the field to determine 
causes and intervention in order to avoid the recurrence of similar 
events. The first step in the analysis of post-injury is a comparison 
between the different databases, where you can find interesting 
information about the accident events. Some of the main databases are 
highlighted:  
 INAIL - National Institute for Insurance against Accidents at Work 
which manages the Italian accident databases;  
 NOHSC - National Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 
which manages the database of Australia (Safe Work Australia);  
 OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration that 
manages the database of the United States of America;  
 MSHA - Mine Safety and Health Administration that manages the 
database of the United States of America with regard to mining 
activities;  
 EU-OSHA - European Agency for Safety and Health at Work that 
manages the data of the European member states participating in 
the ESAW project (a project in which they are codified a number 
of variables to which all the countries of the Community should 
refer). 
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THE BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF A POST-EVENT INVESTIGATION 
PROTOCOL FOR RELATED ACCIDENTS 
All the techniques of injury’s analysis, as well as the statistical analysis of accident data, 
are definitely an essential tool but obviously not enough to set up a correct work of 
prevention. This requires a deeper analysis of the dynamics that has carried to the event 
without to omit important news and connected details to it. A thorough accident 
analysis is used to define correctly the causes and at the same time it provides 
necessary information in order to avoid that the same event will happen again. 
Principal difficulties are: 
 To identify which information should be considered related to the event; 
 To create a tool that allows to properly collect all the information; 
 To make the instrument to enable a subsequent study for preventive purposes. 
Before to proceed to in detail explain the structure of the analysis technique developed, 
it is necessary to explain one of the initially concepts: the analysis must be developed 
for preventive purposes and then not only it must use accident events, but also 
incidental situations that did not involve human consequences. 
In fact, almost accidents or near miss, often overlooked, are to be closely monitored as 
indicators of an anomaly. Experience shows that the recurrence of abnormal situations, 
sooner or later, probably also leads to injury. 
For this reason, if you were able to eliminate near-miss, you should also reduce the 
possibility of accidents occurrence, regardless of their severity (Heinrich, 1931). 
The development of the thoughts behind the in-depth analysis technique 
The objective previewed to get a impartial analysis of the causal chain of events that 
lead to accidents, so that a thorough knowledge of how and why it happened may 
provide suggestions in order to avoid repeating of similar situations. The basic 
purpose was to provide a formalized method to trace without subjective 
interpretations (11)(Reason, 1998) to the chain of events that led to the accident. 
Among the available techniques have been taken into consideration (see [Cigna C., 
Enrico M., Patrucco M., Scioldo G., 2004], [Palamara F., Demichela M., 2007], 
[Mure`S., Demichela M., Piccinini N., 2006], [Demichela M., Murè S., Cigna C., Monai 
L., Patrucco M., 2010]): 
 CEA – Cause Effect Analysis (cause ad effect diagram or Ishikawa diagram); 
 RCA – (Root cause analysis); 
 CCA – Cause Consequence Analysis  
Testing them on several cases, it was found that: 
 CEA is applicable for very simple systems, because in those complexes it 
becomes extremely difficult to avoid to make the mistake of putting in 
multiple branches the same question (intermediate event), which no longer 
allows to solve completely the system; 
 RCA method,  designed for applications in very complex scenarios (such as 
operating rooms), lends itself to criticism referred to the note. itself 
automatically to criticism referred to the note. 
Then the choice is addressed for the CCA approach, which has proven to be the most 
suitable for an objective analysis of the events dynamics that led to the accident, 
and due to the structural and formal similarity with ETA (Event Tree Analysis) and 
FTA techniques (fault Tree Analysis) lends itself to run a dual path: 
injury → intermediate events → Root causes 
useful for a correct and objective understanding of the causes of the accident and: 
root causes →event tree →Top Event (injury) 
                                                             
11 Too many times in the accidents analysis you are faced with interpretations forehead proposed by hasty analysts or 
based on a way of thinking that can be traced to the approach refers to the person of Reason:  
Person approach 
The longstanding and widespread tradition of the person approach focuses on the unsafe acts - errors and procedural 
violations - of people at the sharp end: nurses, physicians, surgeons, anaesthetists, pharmacists, and the like. It views 
these unsafe acts as arising primarily from aberrant mental processes such as forgetfulness, inattention, poor 
motivation, carelessness, negligence, and recklessness. Naturally enough, the associated countermeasures are 
directed mainly at reducing unwanted variability in human behaviour. These methods include poster campaigns that 
appeal to people's sense of fear, writing another procedure (or adding to existing ones), disciplinary measures, threat 
of litigation, retraining, naming, blaming, and shaming. Followers of this approach tend to treat errors as moral issues, 
assuming that bad things happen to bad people what psychologists have called the just world hypothesis. 
The person approach remains the dominant tradition in medicine, as elsewhere. From some perspectives it has much 
to commend it. Blaming individuals is emotionally more satisfying than targeting institutions. People are viewed as 
free agents capable of choosing between safe and unsafe modes of behaviour. If something goes wrong, it seems 
obvious that an individual (or group of individuals) must have been responsible. Seeking as far as possible to uncouple 
a person's unsafe acts from any institutional responsibility is clearly in the interests of managers. It is also legally more 
convenient, at least in Britain.  
 
 
precious aid -  through the application of Boolean operators - not only for the 
formulation of measures to prevent the Top Event, but especially for an efficient 
identification of critical paths (Cut Sets) on which to allocate the prevention efforts. 
Cause Consequence Analysis - CCA  
The CCA is a technique for identifying hazards and it represents both FTA (Fault Tree 
Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis) and ETA (Event Tree Analysis and Event Tree 
Analysis) (CCPS,1992),  where: 
- FTA technique is characterized by the construction of a graphic model that 
shows the combinations of deviations that have for resulted a specific 
negative situation chosen as the object of analysis. This model is constituted 
by boxes containing failures and logical paths  with AND / OR gates that 
connect them; 
- ETA, formally similar to the FTA, it is, in terms of approach, the exact 
opposite: while FTA is a deductive process that starts from a result (TOP 
EVENT) to go up again to the causes of it, ETA considers an initial event and it 
follows with inductive method the different development paths and different 
final results that such event can have in the system. 
Like any hazard assessment technique, the CCA is characterized by the following 
basic requirements: 
1. Systematic The analysis must be carried out according to a precise 
logical thread so as not to skip any point, that it can reveal 
then as weak element of the system. 
2. Completeness It need to be certain that all variables able to produce 
critical situation are examined. 
3. Formalization The study must be conducted in a predetermined and 
repeatable way, so that to distance of time it can be 
reconstructed step by step by different people than the 
original version. It is also important that this formalization 
does not become a mere bureaucracy and that the 
documents produced are easy to understand. 
This technique is applied to the resolution of systems of faults whose logic is easy to 
identify the relationships between specific situations of damage and their root 
causes, but also the analysis of the accidents for the injuries prevention in any 
environments job. Its greatest peculiarity is in the type of graphic layout, that allows 
a quick understanding of the problem and the results from the users. On the other 
hand, the technique is particularly suited to the study of events not too complex as it 
ensures a good objectivity and results, under the graphic aspect, few bulky and 
effective.  
The analysis is carried out according to the following steps: 
1. selection of the event to be appraised, correspondent to what you would 
choose as initial event if you had to make an ETA; 
2. protections identification and path tracking that conduct to the situation 
resulted, as in an ETA (it only changes the symbology used); 
3. within every path ETA, development of the initial event and the logical 
functions at all levels to identify the root causes, according to the procedure of 
FTA [considering the initial event the TOP EVENTS (the negative situation to be 
implored) each of a fault tree]; 
4. evaluation of the MCS (MINIMAL CUT SET: shorter sequences of failure to 
reach the TOP EVENT) that they lead to the result of every path, intending for 
"paths" the sums of the horizontal paths typical of ETA with branches raised 
vertically from the analysis FTA applied the initial event and each branch, thus it 
departs from the root causes and it get to the final result; 
The CCA, therefore, allows to go up to the indirect causes, even if:  
- they are multiple;  
- they are of Technological, organizational and behavioural type.  
In fact it is possible to define the CCA as the ability to identify the root causes of 
backward deviation and to appraise the probability of event repetition in case of 
non-compliance. 
If you analyze in depth an injury you discover that to occur the following conditions 
must be subsist:  
- The presence of a danger factor or material agent such as the electric 
current, a hot surface, the altitude, etc..;  
- The presence of a deviation (event, deviating from the norm, that leads to 
the accident and characterized by a probability of occurrence) that involves a 
contact with the danger factor. 
The deviation and the contact with the danger factor are related by a precise 
dynamic of the harmful event in turn followed by a consequence (eg. burns, 
fracture, etc..), By damage characterized by its entity (light, severe , deadly).  
The CCA allows just to set the attention and to investigate on the causes of deviation 
and to go back to the "root causes" of accidents. 
The investigation protocol 
The structure of Cause Consequence Analysis (CCA), on which the protocol 
founds him, 
The structure of cause-Consequence analysis, which is based on the protocol can 
be represented according to a scheme to tree in which the initiating events are 
gathered in categories of reference, the so-called root causes, such as:  
A. structural and plant internal / external characteristics;  
B. equipment (machines) and temporary works;  
C. physical, chemical, biological aspects of workplaces;  
D. interference of functional volumes;  
E. audit, supervision, operating procedures & IFT;  
F. revision and updating of the system, and maintenance;  
G. physiological and ideological aspects of the subjects involved. 
For all the categories of events that constitute the chain, until to reach the 
initiating events, it is established to use pre-identified groups of items (collected 
by the classifications ESAW (Eurostat, 2012 edition), as well as from databases or 
edited), so as to eliminate the possibility of confusion with synonyms by the 
analyst. 
Table 8: Root Causes and Indirect Cause of II Level definition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External criticality 
- General criticality [boundary conditions ( eg. 
topography, climate, availability of services, 
sociological context)] 
- Specific criticality (seismicity, area exposed to floods, 
avalanches, ...) 
- General structural aspects (eg. general and local 
stability, allowable loads, materials, quality, efficiency, 
...) 
Structure - Specific structural Aspects [eg. Structural safety 
equipment, escape routes (eg fire escape) and safe 
places]  
- Consistency with the uses 
- General Plants [eg.  distribution systems (production) 
of energy,  management systems of the general 
environmental conditions (eg, heating, cooling, air 
exchange, lighting,...), communication systems] 
Common Plant 
- Specific Pants (systems of emergency management, 
detection, contrast and alarm) 
STRUCTURAL AND 
PLANT INTERNAL / 
EXTERNAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Structure maintenance - Conservation work - Participation of adaptation to the norms 
Typology 
- Machine [tool, operator, auxiliary (eg. pollutant 
collection systems, cooling, heating, ...)]  
- Work Equipment [instrumentation, equipment, 
localized systems of transport energy (eg. power 
cables, ...)]  
- Machinery and transport equipment  
- Devices (command and control, signaling, security)  
- Works provisional (eg. scaffolding, ...) 
EQUIPMENT 
(MACHINES) AND 
TEMPORARY WORKS 
Choice and conditions of use 
- Suitability to he development of specific operations in 
the context  
- Installation  
- How to use  
- Maintenance status 
Physical - chemical - biological  
critical of working environment 
- Raw materials and process products  
- Products resulting from process deviations  
- Chemical pollutants (solid, liquid, gaseous)  
- Physical pollutants (eg noise, vibration, 
electromagnetic fields and radiation, ...)  
- Biological agents (eg, viruses, bacteria, ...) 
PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL, 
BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF 
WORKPLACES Localized solutions for the 
management of environmental 
conditions 
- Environmental treatment (eg. thermal insulation, 
acoustic, ...)  
- Lighting  
- Massing available 
INTERFERENCE OF 
FUNCTIONAL VOLUMES 
 Mecanical systems 
 Mec. sist..- operator 
 Operator - operator 
Use of functional volumes 
- Vehicles / machinery / plant / equipment in motion, 
controlled by operator  
- Vehicles / machinery / plant / equipment, automated 
motion (controlled by PLC)  
- Workers on the move 
AUDIT, SUPERVISION, 
OPERATING 
PROCEDURES & IFT 
Procedure 
- Audit ; 
- Supervision;  
- Procedures for workers;  
- Procedures for machine operators;  
- Procedures for personnel systems;  
- Procedures for supervisors;  
- Procedures for special operations personnel;  
- Information, formation and Training  
REVISION AND 
UPDATING OF THE 
SYSTEM, AND 
MAINTENANCE 
Operating conditions 
- Test 
- Verification functionality before to use 
- Types of maintenance applied  
- Revision  
- Updating systems 
Ideological and subject aspects 
- Behaviour (available to any person to produce answers, 
determined from the environment, family regarding 
social situations, groups, and objects)  
- Position in relation to the duty cycle and the number of 
shifts  
- Relationships with supervisors and subordinates  
- Contract / employment 
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND 
IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
OF THE SUBJECTS 
INVOLVED 
physiological Aspects 
- Age  
- Work Experience  
- Conditions of health  
- Psycho-physical state (eg, depressed, sleepy, drunk, 
drugged, ...)  
- Attitude (predisposition for a particular mental or 
physical activity) 
The main areas of reference, however, are solved by the application of possible 
solutions in order to manage the risk associated with a particular occupation, 
identified as: 
Table 9: Example of intervention type 
TECHNICAL 
INTERVENTIONS 
 Structural, plant and technology solutions for the 
workplace management   
 Plant / technologies solutions for the residual risks 
management of individual current operational 
situations (vs. the progress of technology and 
knowledge)  
 Technological/Plant solutions for interference 
management: current operational situations  
 Detection / signal / alarm deviations systems 
(emergencies) external or internal (from process 
deviations)  
 Technological / plant solutions contrast deviations 
(emergencies) external or internal (from process 
deviations) and provided means intervention 
PROCEDURALE 
AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
INTERVENTIONS 
 Definition of the working phases and the contingent 
operations for the subjects (to the several levels)  
 Procedures for checking presence  
 Procedures of the action of the preplaces to the 
several levels  
 Operational procedures for the current operating 
conditions (Signs of danger, prohibition and 
obligation: call procedure)  
 Procedures of verification, control and detection / 
reporting / management of elementary functional 
anomalies 
  Procedures for ordinary and extraordinary 
maintenance of sites / facilities / equipment including 
emergency management internal / external  
 Procedures for the detection / warning / alarm 
emergencies external or internal (from process 
deviations)  
 Operating procedures in emergency situations internal 
or external (uncontrollable evolution process) - Signs 
of Emergency (call procedure),  
 Operating Procedures contrast of external 
(emergencies) or internal deviation (process 
deviations) - emergency intervention teams 
As illustrated in the following figure, going back scheme beginning from the 
identification of the hazard, it is possible to define preventive measures in 
oreder to avoid the event under analysis, while going along this pattern as the 
entity of the lesion, and then identify the direct, indirect of I and II level, the root 
causes that led to the accident event. 
  
Figure 7: Logical Diagram of the investigation Protocol  
 
It has been therefore possible to establish a logical connection between the 
principles of Management Occupational Risks assumed like macro-areas of 
reference and the various categories of initiating events where the intermediate 
events in the chain of causes can be attributed (see Table 10), reaching for a tree 
that goes back to the criteria, which refers to the criteria of Table 10. 
 
       Table 10: Macro-areas of reference and categories of events initiators  
 
 
Table 11: Informing criteria of the investigation technique post-event elaborated  
 inside of the tree every series of events, developed as a list of causal events,  
is grouped into categories of sequential reference, in order to proceed along 
the tree until the initiating events; 
 The number of categories of intermediate events adopted was defined 
through experimentations conducted on real cases: the proposed outline can 
provide sufficient completeness of reference for shipbuilding and industry 
events; 
 for the several categories of constituent events the chain, including initiators, 
refers to pre-identified groups of items, eliminating the possibility of arbitrary 
using of definition and synonyms by the analyst. 
 
For the several categories have been taken in the lists compiled from an analysis 
of computerized systems cured from national  agencies and organizations, 
European and non-European countries (see Table 11).  
Such approach, although "bulky" in the paper version, is useful for 
implementation in computer assisted systems where the analyst can make 
unique choices on the drop down menu. 
Genesis of the levels 
In the following table, for a better understanding of the protocol, it gives to 
illustrate the different levels of the scheme of the philosophical thought 
represented in Figure 7: 
 
Macro aree di 
riferimento 
Categorie cui ascrivere gli eventi iniziatori 
 A ÷ D Safety flaws at 
the work planning 
stage (poor PtD 
action) 
 
 E ÷ G: Safety flaws at 
the work 
management stage 
A. structural and plant internal / external 
characteristics; 
B. equipment (machines) and temporary 
works; 
C. physical, chemical, biological aspects of 
workplaces; 
D. interference of functional volumes; 
E. audit, supervision, operating procedures & 
IFT; 
F. revision and updating of the system, and 
maintenance;; 
G. audit, supervision, operating procedures & 
IFT. 
 
Table 12: Explanation of the different components of the accident  consequences processing within the protocol developed  
Injury 
consequences 
Reference from which the list was drawn up In the software 
Severity 
(Days lost) 
ESAW encoding phase 2 (1996) [ld]  
Definition: ‘number of full calendar days’ where the victim is unfit for work due to an 
accident at work. Are included only cases of accident involving an absence from work of 
more than 3 days 
As mentioned above only full calendar days of absence from work of the victim have to be 
considered, excluding the day of the accident.  
updated according to specific 
criteria for hospital 
emergency departments 
(introduction of codes of 
discharge) and simplification 
of the method ESAW 
Part of body 
injured 
ESAW encoding phase 1 (1993)  
Definition: description of the part of the body injured. 
The ESAW methodology and data delivery allows only one choice, i.e. only one code can be 
chosen to describe the injured part(s) of the body. In cases where several parts of the body 
have been injured, the most serious injury should be chosen e.g. an amputation ranks 
above a bone fracture, which ranks above a wound etc. In other cases a code for 
multiple sites should be used at the appropriate level of the classification, e.g., broken 
hand and foot. In cases where larger parts of the body have been affected, e.g., injuries 
caused by burns or skalds, a code for multiple sites should be used as well.  
Type of injury 
ESAW encoding phase 1 (1993)  
Definition: ‘physical consequences for the victim’ e.g. bone fracture, wounds etc. 
In case of multiple injuries suffered in one accident where one of the injuries is obviously 
more severe than the others, then this accident should be classified in the group 
corresponding to the nature of the more obviously severe injury. Only in cases where the 
victim has contracted two or more types of injuries and one of them cannot be said to be 
more serious than the other(s) the code ‘multiple injuries’ should be used. 
The current classification is used for the new data ESAW 1997, in accordance with the 
recommendation of the ILO  
updated according to specific 
criteria for hospital 
emergency departments 
 
Table 13: Categorie di eventi, loro derivazione e possibili associazioni 
EVENTS 
CATEGORIES 
Reference from which the causal events list has been drawn up for use in software  Possible Associations 
ESAW encoding phase 3 (2001) -  " Contact and mode of injury" 
Objective cause 
events directly and 
univocally 
associated to the 
result of the event 
Definition: the contact that injured the victim. 
This describes how the victim was hurt (physical or mental trauma) by the ‘Material 
Agent’ that caused the injury. If there are several ‘Contacts -Modes of Injury’, the one 
causing the most serious injury must be recorded. 
The classification follows the structure indicated below: 
10-29: The various injuries with non-mechanical sources (poison, temperature, electricity 
and asphyxiation); 
30-69: The various injuries with mechanical sources; 
70-79: The various injuries caused by physical or mental stress; 
80-89: The various injuries caused by animals or humans. 
1 
the medical report can 
determine which is the 
priority even in the 
presence of possible 
causes 
ESAW encoding phase 3 (2001) -  "deviations" 
Indirect cause of 
first level 
events associated 
to the category in 
which the identified 
objective cause re-
enters 
The proposed Deviation classification describes the abnormal event, such as totally or 
partially losing control of a machine or falling onto/off something. 
If there are several interlinked events, the last Deviation must be recorded (the Deviation 
closest in time to the Contact — Mode of Injury). 
The Deviation nomenclature has been organised into the following groups: 
Groups 10-30 The Deviation is normally out of the injured person’s control and is mainly 
due to equipment problems. 
Groups 40-50 The victim totally or partially loses control of something (including falls). 
Groups 60-70 Body movements. 
Group 80 The victim, another person or an animal is an active party to the accident. 
The classification must be clear and unambiguous, for which reason codes like ‘bulky, 
cumbersome, inadeguate equipment’ have been removed from the classification. 
multiple  
often in part 
concurrent, select from 
case to case 
Original processing of criticality categories associated with the  Root Causes 
Indirect cause of 
second level 
events associated 
to the category in 
which the identified 
indirect causes of 
first level 
1. External criticality  
2. Structures 
3. Common Plant 
4. Structures maintenance 
5. Typology 
6. Choice and conditions of use  
7. Physical - chemical - biological  critical of working environment 
8. Localized solutions for the management of environmental conditions  
9. Use of functional volumes  
10. Procedure 
11. Operating conditions   
12. Ideological and subject aspects  
13. physiological Aspects  
multiple  
often in part 
concurrent, select from 
case to case 
Root causes 
Original processing obtained by repeat 
testing on a consistent series of events 
characterized by injury information 
detailed and comprehensive 
A. External/internal structural and plant 
characteristics 
B. Machinery, equipment and provisional 
works 
C. Physical, chemical and biological aspects of 
the work environment 
D. Interference of functional volumes 
E. Audit, Supervision, Operating procedures & 
IFT 
F. Revision, Updating and Maintenances  
A. Physiological, Subjective and ideological 
aspects 
multiple  
often in part 
concurrent, select from 
case to case 
macro categories of 
cases in which the 
root causes are 
Derived directly from the principles of occupational risks management   
3 
also concomitant 
grouped  
 
CRITICALITIES TECHNICAL CRITICALITIES WORK PLANNING AND CRITICALITIES PROCEDURAL 
Structural, plant and technology solutions for 
the workplace management   
Plant / technologies solutions for the residual 
risks management of individual current 
operational situations (vs. the progress of 
technology and knowledge)  
Technological/Plant solutions for interference 
management: current operational situations  
Detection / signal / alarm deviations systems 
(emergencies) external or internal (from process 
deviations)  
Technological / plant solutions contrast 
deviations (emergencies) external or internal 
(from process deviations) and provided means 
intervention 
 
Definition of the working phases and the 
contingent operations for the subjects (to the 
several levels)  
 
Procedures for checking presence  
Procedures of the action of the preplaces to the 
several levels  
Operational procedures for the current operating 
conditions (Signs of danger, prohibition and 
obligation: call procedure)  
Procedures of verification, control and detection / 
reporting / management of elementary functional 
anomalies 
 Procedures for ordinary and extraordinary 
maintenance of sites / facilities / equipment 
including emergency management internal / 
external  
Procedures for the detection / warning / alarm 
emergencies external or internal (from process 
deviations)  
Operating procedures in emergency situations 
internal or external (uncontrollable evolution 
process) - Signs of Emergency (call procedure),  
Operating Procedures contrast of external 
(emergencies) or internal deviation (process 
deviations) - emergency intervention teams 
TECHNICAL INTERVENTIONS  WORK PLANNING AND PROCEDURAL INTERVENTIONS 
Associated with the 
precedent for 
prevention scope 
(backward path:  
interventions 
families needed to 
prevent the 
evolution of the 
causes chain with 
the control of root 
causes) 
Original processing obtained by repeat testing on a consistent series of events 
characterized by injury information detailed and comprehensive and e from the 
adaptation of technical standards 
Multiple 
Concomitant for 
categories, and also in 
the same category 
Hazard factor 
Original processing obtained by UNI EN ISO 12100:2010 (Safety of machinery -- General 
principles for design -- Risk assessment and risk reduction), that replaces EN 292, 1991, 
and supplemented by considerations relating to the structure and the working 
environment  
Multiple also 
concomitant 
Hazard factors 
identification 
Reference to the listo f H.I. Technique and selection criteria of them Multiple also 
concomitant 
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COMPUTER ASSISTED TECHNOLOGY: from the collection of the 
information on accidental and Near Miss events to the analysis for 
prevention purposes  
Safety is based on the prevention implementation and not on repairing action, so it is 
of primary importance to act before abnormal events occur and to anticipate, rather 
than check their results. But in order to apply this philosophy, it must make so that all 
the injury and/or near misses information, necessary of the preventive analysis, are 
collected in a clear, complete and objective way. 
Then once available all the data are, it will be possible to apply the analysis and 
extrapolate the possible actions to ensure the hazardous situations elimination. 
The Data collection Approach  
The collection of injury information must involve different points to highlight all 
the fundamental slight to allow later an objective and effective analysis with the 
aims of prevention. 
On the base of the principles that founds the investigation protocol, it has been 
developed, with the interaction and participation of Occupational Medicine 
gradutates of the CTO, a questionnaire of collection information, that it was 
applied and tested in the reality of the Emergency Department of the same 
hospital (at the time of triage of the patient in case of not serious accidents and at 
the moment of discharge in case of serious injury). 
The purpose of this document has been therefore to go from one side to complete 
the complaint accident module of INAIL , and on the other hand to offer a tool 
easy to use and that can speed up analysis, in order to help both the INAIL and 
analyst to trace clearly the causal chain of events, identifying responsibilities and 
application solutions. 
The developed model is presented as a questionnaire composed of different 
sections of questions with multiple choice pre-identified answer. The questions 
were selected on the base of the INAIL original document and relevant to the 
investigation protocol aspects, only in the coding of the injury severity it has had to 
resort to two types of classification (in the acceptance module of hospital 
emergency departments it was used the code of discharge; in the protocol 
developed the indices of permanent, temporary disability, and death) because 
these documents are addressed at two different times of the injury analysis. The 
model is: 
Model 1: Data collection model developed for the acceptance in hospital emergency department 
and to improve the complaint accident module of INAIL  
 
 
 


 Essentially the module is composed of four sections: 
1. Firs section: basic identifying information are requested (the initial name, 
sex, age, nationality, level of education); 
2. Injury section: is framed in terms of the day, hour and place the event, by 
pointing out even if there were the presence of natural disasters; is 
analyzed the type of injury (on-site or in transit), location and nature of the 
injury, gravity (for simplicity identified with the codes of discharge of the 
emergency room), prognosis, and finally the health of the injured before 
the accident. 
3. Relationship between the worker and the work environment: distance 
from the worker's house to the work place, the means used to reach work 
place, type of employment status of the worker, type of economic activity 
of work environment, workplace, the environmental quality of the working 
reality, subdivision of the working space, the presence of other machinery 
and persons moving in the injury place and finally the specific work of the 
injured, illustrating his profession, the type carried out working and the 
respective training, PPE, working hours performed; 
4. accident in transit: it is left open field for the explanation of what 
happened.  
5. accident on-site: it is gone to pay attention to what happened at the time 
of the accident like the working activity of the victim, even if it was a 
routine activity, the specific activity or what exactly was the victim and if 
used machines / equipment for the operation. 
The computer assisted technique for the in-depth analysis of Work 
related Accidents 
The software is developed with Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 Professional. The user 
(analysts, business and court consultants, technicians of supervisors, etc.) interacts 
easy with the program: he is driven in the compilation of a series of tabs for 
collecting data through windows, fields and drop-down menu that reduce the 
possibility of errors, that afford to obtain an adequate schematic leaving little 
space for subjective interpretation of the facts and avoid that important 
information about the event are left out.  
The structure of the program is realized thanks to the collaboration of the Turin 
computer science study Geo & Soft of Eng. George Scioldo. 
The structure of the software  
 
The software is structured according to twelve different sections listed below:  
1. Identifying Details of the event  
2. Data injured 
3. Enterprise of Injured  
4. Risk Analysis of injured enterprise  
5. Host Enterprise (possible card)  
6. Accident consequences  
7. Boundary data  
8. Injury information  
9. Analysis of corporate risk  
10. Causes Analysis and Prevention  
a. Direct Cause  
b. Indirect Causes of the First Level  
c. Causes indirect Second Level  
d. Association of the causes  
e. Analysis of the causes  
f. Interventions  
g. Association of interventions  
h. Analysis of the interventions  
11. Solutions  
12. Final data  
The sections, each composed of one or more cards where the different variables 
are linked logically, following a kind of guided tour that permits a rapid data 
collection, and allows, if it can’t be possible to compile them immediately, to 
temporarily skip some fields; in fact, it is not said that the user, who collects the 
accident data just happened, has the possibility to know instantaneously all the 
information of which he needs.  
Besides the fields where this is not possible (thinking to the injured name and the 
surname), the compilation of the other is based on the choice among the various 
options, presented by drop – down menu and by predefined voices of every 
variable, reducing minimizing the possibilities of compilation error. 
Many of the predefined voices have been drafts from the ESAW classification 
(Eurostat, 2012)  (Appendix A contains a list), but some are revisited or integrated 
in accordance with what found in other databases and especially thanks to the 
experience matured from direct tests with the lists on real cases.  
The section of the causes analysis and prevention allows the connection to other 
eight cards, that are designed specifically to go back, through different levels, to 
accident Root Causes and to obtain important information for the prevention. 
 
RICERCA CAUSE – criterio generale per la compilazione del programma 
A. Injury consequence (severity, type of injury 
and part of body injured) 
[selected by the ESAW encodings Phase 1 and 
2, revised and reworked on the selection in 
Accident Consequences] 
1. Direct Cause  
B. Only and obligatory selection of the injury 
Direct/Objective Cause (selected by the ESAW 
encodings Phase 3 " Contact and mode of 
injury") 
2. Multiple selection of indirect causes of first level  
     (selected by the ESAW encodings Phase 3 " deviations”) 
3. Multiple selection of indirect causes of second level of event anda root 
causes identification  
     (selected by original processing of categories associated to Root Causes) 
4. Association of the causes -  It is associated to each Indirect Cause of II 
Level, chosen during the CCA, a letter of the alphabet in according to the 
principle of cause - effect applicable in the reverse path among the levels 
identified: the causes of the upper level are the causes, while those of the 
lower level, closely related, are the effects. 
5. Analysis of the Causes: it is visualized the graphical layout that illustrates 
links among the various causes previously selected and also by selection 
of the shortest path carries in passages short to the incident  
technical criticalities 
6. Interventions : Application of the 
risks management implemetation 
of event (grouped into macro 
categories of intervention 
selectable derived from the 
principles of management - 
original processing) : 
 Safety flaws at the worl 
planning stage (poor PtD 
action) 
 Safety flaws at the work 
management stage 
procedural criticalities and work 
planning criticalities 
7. Association of interventions: it is associated with each intervention, 
chosen during the CCA, a letter of the alphabet in according to the cause - 
effect principle applicable in the reverse path among the levels identified.. 
8. Analysis of interventions: it is visualized the graphical layout that 
illustrates links among the various interventions and causes previously 
selected and also by selection of the shortest path carries in 
passages short to the incident  
Identifying Details of the event  
This first section includes all the necessary information to describe the 
event, to individualize of the people that occupy and that they have 
intervened. 
 
Figure 8: Identifying details of the events card 
In this card it focus on some fundamental aspect, such as “Accident 
Place”: it defines if the accident is happened in head office or in a branch 
office of work, or in other enterprise or in transit. According to the 
chosen case there will be various way to operate and to take part. 
Data Injured  
The second section regards the data, both personal type that professional 
type, which relate to the injured person. 
 
 Figure 9: Data injured card 
 
This section, besides to include the necessary data for identification of 
the worker, requires information about the contractual and working 
position of the injured. In Italy, INAIL in case of an accident is the 
responsible institution for protecting the worker economically and to 
cover any costs of treatment and recovery in hospital. 
Among the voices also appears the "preferred language by the injured." 
Some indications about these data are contained in Legislative Decree n.. 
81/2008 Title I, Chapter III, Section IV, Art. 36 (information to the 
workers). 
More specifically, in paragraph 4 it is provided that "the content of the 
worker information must be easily understandable and must enable 
them to acquire the relevant knowledge. 
Where the information relates to foreign workers, it is done after 
checking the understanding of the language used in the “information 
path".  
A linguistic misunderstanding may therefore contribute to the occurrence 
of an accident. 
Firm of employee  
This section requires the information on organization for which the 
injured works. It can regard both the private and public sector. 
 
Figure 10: Firm of employee of injured card 
 
The variables required are used to frame the economic - productive 
environment - in which operate the injured activity (Public Sector, Private 
or Third Parties present at Legitimate Title). 
In this card it specify where exactly the PO has working, which in head 
office or in a branch office. 
Furthermore, once identified the type of affiliation economic/private of 
PO it is specified the essential characteristics of this sector by introducing 
the "company documents security", as the Legislative Decree no. 81/08 
requires risks analysis for all activities that are not at major accident risk, 
which falling instead in the DPR 175/88 and modify better known as 
"Seveso Directive". 
Art. 17 of the Legislative Decree n. 81/08 provides that the employer can 
not delegate the evaluation of safety and health risks of workers, and let 
alone the development of the document to be drawn up at the end of the 
evaluation. 
It 'important to note that as reported by art. 29 the employer carries out 
the evaluation and processes the document in collaboration with the 
responsible of preventions and protection service, and the competent 
doctor, after consultation with the representative of the workers' safety. 
This appraisal must be immediately revised in the event of changes in the 
production process or in the organization of work for the health and 
safety of workers, or in relation to the degree of technical evolution, for 
prevention or protection as a result of injuries or when the results of 
health surveillance show that it is necessary.  
The existence of the safety documentation (of which the date of 
preparation and last update is always required) is therefore very 
important, since, in addition to meeting the requirements from the law, it 
allows to get more quickly to the identification of injury causes. 
Risks Analysis of injured enterprise  
 
Figure 11: Risks analysis of injured enterprise card 
 
This section includes data regarding the essential characteristics of the 
present safety documentation in the company at the time of the 
accident, in particular the modalities of execution and elaboration, likes 
the methodology used for the Risk Assessment. Particular attention is 
given on how it is processed the risk assessment in the company, 
identifying first of all which techniques were used for the Hazard 
identification. Then the attention is placed on the methods of risk 
calculation, where depending on the selection of the type of ED 
(severity), FC (contact factor) and P (probability of occurrence) is 
evaluated "Objective" or "Subjective" the risk assessment prepared 
(L.Faina et al., 1996-97). 
At last, the relationship between risk assessment and place where the 
accident occurred is evaluated, or if the employee had been the subject 
of training with respect to the process under investigation, and to the 
possible presence of Protective Clothing and / or DPI . 
Host Enterprise  
This card is optional, it is activated only if the card "Identification Details 
of Event" to the question " Injury Place " is chosen "at another company": 
 
Figure 12: Host enterprise card 
 
The card is analogous to that of the "Enterprise of injured", but simplified 
in a description of the sector of affiliation and in the address of the head 
office.  
Even here the focus is on the safety documentation, in this case the 
"DUVRI", and the safety figures in the branch office. 
Injury consequences 
It goes on to analyze what has occurred when the event happened: 
 
Figure 13: Injury consequences card 
 
 the type of relief that took place immediately after the incident to 
the injured;  
 Type of injury;  
 Part of body injured;  
 Severity (days lost) of the accident. 
The severity identified before with days of prognosis and then in definitve 
days is a list of pre-identified choices starting from the ESAW encoding 
Phase 2 (1996) - lost days, which means the number of calendar days in 
which the victim has been absent from work due to an accident at work, 
which is updated according to specific criteria for hospital emergency 
departments (introduction of codes of discharge) and so a simplification 
of the ESAW method. 
While the part of body injured  and type of injury have been draft from 
ESAW encoding Phase 1 (1993), updated in accordance with specific 
criteria for hospital emergency departments (introduction of codes of 
discharge) and simplification of the method ESAW. 
Boundary data 
This section applies to those data that surround the accident but that are 
important in order to define greater detail the context in which it 
occurred. 
 
Figure 14: Boundary Data card 
 
The first field allows to indicate if the accident has happened outside or 
in an enclosed space and the related environmental parameters: it is 
understandable as adverse weather conditions or environments with 
non-optimal microclimate (noise, darkness, humidity, etc..) increase the 
likelihood of injury. 
Another interesting data regards the worker’s physical or mental 
condition, before to take the service: it is clear that a impaired person is 
mainly subject to a possible accident at work.  
The focus then shifted to the communication modalities of the accident 
and to witnesses people who have unwittingly participated to the event. 
Injury Informations 
This section contains important variables that allow to go back with 
greater precision to the dynamics of the event. 
 
Figure 15: Injury Informations card 
A description of the moment when something of anomalous has occurred 
is importance for the description of the injury, such as what the victim 
was making at the time of the accident. 
The causes and circumstances include 3 levels of data:  
 The description of the circumstances before the injury occurrence 
- workstation, working environment, working process, specific 
physical activity;  
 The deviation; 
  The Contact and mode of injury. 
It is, therefore, of fundamental importance the material agent, something 
(materials, machinery or equipment, methods and activity) that has the 
potential to cause a damage; it is the responsible agent for the accident 
and also it is closely linked to the injury event. 
It needs to know every aspect about its equipment involved, both the 
principals characteristics, both the state and the type of maintenance 
performed and the conformity or not with national legislation.  
According to the material agent involved it can execute  statistics search. 
The card moreover allows the possibility to insert a schematic drawing or 
a photograph of the accident occurred; this is important, as well as to 
better understand the dynamics of the accident, but also the violations 
that have occurred up to the time of the accident and in what ways the 
company has answered. 
Causes Analysis and Prevention  
This is the section that affords the connection to the cards in which 
CCA(Cause - Consequence Analysis, which analyzes the causes - 
consequences) to the accident is applied, and in which prevention speech 
is thorough. Leaving from the severity and the type of injury, it is possible 
to reach the Root Causes, and from these, through a backtracking, it is 
possible to derive useful indications in order to effect the interventions 
implementation with the aim to avoid that event is retabled. 
 
Figure 16: Cause analysis and prevention card 
DIRECT CAUSE 
 
Figure 17: Direct Cause card 
In this card, the type of injury is taken again from the selection in the 
"Accident Consequences" card, moreover it can be integrated with the 
data obtainable from the medical report. 
So on the base of type of injury, the direct cause of the accident can be 
chosen. Initially groups of causes are proposed and selected one of these,  
the subgroups associated with it appear. 
The choice regards a single cause, in fact an injury happens according to a 
precise direct cause.  
The MODIFY button allows to enable the modification of the selection. 
Once the group and the direct cause are selected, the choice can’t be 
changed except by selecting such command. 
Then after the selection it will have to push NEXT button to proceed to 
the next card. 
INDIRECT CAUSES OF FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL 
 
Figure 18: Indirect causes of first level card 
On the card of indirect cause of 1st and 2nd level with the aid of a 
selectable field, the user has the option to choose one or more indirect 
causes of first and second level. Also it can make multiple choices on 
the subgroups of indirect causes previously selected. 
ASSOCIATION OF CAUSES 
 
Figure 19: Association of causes card 
In this card, according to as it is deicide to take action to prevent the 
damage recurrence, a letter of the alphabet with each indirect cause of 
second level, chosen during the CCA, is associated according to the 
cause - effect principle applicable in reverse path among the levels 
identified: causes of higher level are the causes while those of lower 
level, closely linked, are the effects. 
INTERVENTIONS  
 
Figure 20: Interventions card 
The last level of the chain concerns technique, work planning and 
procedural interventions:  
Table 14: Listo f the possible interventions 
Technique Interventions  Structural, plant and technology solutions for 
the workplace management   
 Plant / technologies solutions for the residual 
risks management of individual current 
operational situations (vs. the progress of 
technology and knowledge)  
 Technological/Plant solutions for interference 
management: current operational situations  
 Detection / signal / alarm deviations systems 
(emergencies) external or internal (from process 
deviations)  
 Technological / plant solutions contrast 
deviations (emergencies) external or internal 
(from process deviations) and provided means 
intervention 
Work planning and 
procedural interventions 
 Definition of the working phases and the 
contingent operations for the subjects (to the 
several levels)  
 Procedures for checking presence  
 Procedures of the action of the preplaces to the 
several levels  
 Operational procedures for the current 
operating conditions (Signs of danger, 
prohibition and obligation: call procedure)  
 Procedures of verification, control and detection 
/ reporting / management of elementary 
functional anomalies 
 Procedures for ordinary and extraordinary 
maintenance of sites / facilities / equipment 
including emergency management internal / 
external  
 Procedures for the detection / warning / alarm 
emergencies external or internal (from process 
deviations)  
 Operating procedures in emergency situations 
internal or external (uncontrollable evolution 
process) - Signs of Emergency (call procedure),  
 Operating Procedures contrast of external 
(emergencies) or internal deviation (process 
deviations) - emergency intervention teams 
In this case, interventions are seen as the causes while the causes of 
the second level, closely associated with the Root Causes, are effects. 
The association of one or more letters is fundamental to be able to go 
backwards in the diagram according to Boolean logic based on logical 
operators AND / OR. 
Practically it is looked for understanding which combinations of 
interventions are able to cancel indirect causes of second level. If it is 
considered that all technical/procedural solutions identified are 
necessary must be assigned to each of them the same letter so that we 
can proceed according to a logical AND, while if it exists the possibility 
to have independent solutions but all valid purposes for prevention, it 
must associate to them different letters in order to proceed with a 
logical OR. 
These are substantially the two extreme cases, but there are several 
possible combinations managed from Boolean algebra. 
ANALYSIS OF CAUSES AND INTERVENTIONS 
Graphical layouts, that illustrate from a side links existing among the 
various causes previously selected, from the other the links among the 
various interventions and the various causes previously selected, are 
shown. In both cases, by the selection of buttons: 
 RESOLVE it is evidenced the shortest path that on one side leads 
to the accident in a few passages and from the other it interrups 
the causes chain of injury; 
 RESET it is returned to the initially graph and it can play by 
removing some interventions in order to see what of different 
can be made. 
Solutions   
 
Figure 21: Solution card 
 
This is a summary card of what reported by the software, it start with a 
short description of the injury where it is brought in the foreground the 
causes path identified by the software, until to highlight hazards not 
identified with the related interventions to apply to resolve situations.  
Finally, in the card it is given the opportunity to look for similar cases in 
the Internal Database, in other important Databases, which are previously 
mentioned,  and also the analyst can have the possibility to search in a 
general way on the internet through the use of keywords. 
Final Data 
 
Figure 22: Final Data card 
The last card contains data relating to the closure of the case from the 
bureaucratic and disciplinary point of view.  
Costs, that are originated with the occurrence of the injury, are 
highlighted.  
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APPLICATION OF THE COMPUTER ASSISTED TECHNIQUE 
At the end of software processing it is proceeded to the test of the policy adopted. The 
injury events investigated, analyzed and used for the evolution of software, are 33 (see 
Appendix B) and they have been filed according to a summary table created to contain 
the most significant data of event. The various cards have been organized in this way:  
 from n° 1 to n° 3 are contained accident related to “Extraction mineral from 
quarries and mines” filed;  
 from n° 4 to n° 9 are contained accident related to “Manufacturing activities” field; 
 from n° 10 to n°14 are contained accident related to “Construction” field; 
 from n° 15 is contained an accident related to “Transport and storage” field; 
 from n° 16 to n°30 are contained accident related to “Iron working” field; 
 from n°31 is contained an injury related to agricultural field; 
Analysis of accident in the quarry and mining extraction sector  
 
Deadly injury  for crushing of whole body; the victim presented the results of 
mechanical activity (rotor bar and impact plate of the crusher) with a 
politraumatisme of right lower limb and of his skull which appeared non-existent.  
Figure 23: Bar Mill  
 
Figure 24: Crush equipments  
 
 
 
Table 15: Technique of analysis applied to the event 
 RESEARCH CAUSES ADOPTION PREVENTIVE MEASURES  
    
 ED: 7500 ld  (death)  
Part of body injured: totally of the body and internal organs 
Type of injury: Other types of concussion and internal injuries 
ev. sist. protective passive / active (in the case given the severity 
of the accident – constriction by the movement of the rod / crank 
- PPE protection would not solve the problem 
 
1 
STRUCK BY MOVING OBJECT, COLLISIONS WITH – Struck by object 
in rotation, motion, movement –movement of the impact bars and 
plates of crusher 
At the time of deviation operator intervenes with the machine 
stopped 7 
2 
BREAKAGE, BURSTING, SPLITTING, SLIPPING, FALL, COLLAPSE OF 
MATERIAL AGENT - Breakage, bursting - causing splinters (wood, 
glass, metal, stone, plastic, others  - chalks blocks 
LOSS OF CONTROL (TOTAL OR PARTIAL) OF MACHINE, MEANS OF 
TRANSPORT OR HANDLING EQUIPMENT, HAND-HELD TOOL, 
OBJECT, ANIMAL - Loss of control (total or partial) - of machine 
(including unwanted start-up) or of the material being worked by 
the machine –linked to the fact that crushing was blocked and then 
resumed 
SLIPPING - STUMBLING AND FALLING - FALL OF PERSONS - Fall of 
person - to a lower level –  related to the fact that the person is 
precipitated in the mill bar following the unblocking 
BODY MOVEMENT UNDER OR WITH PHYSICAL STRESS (GENERALLY 
LEADING TO AN INTERNAL INJURY) - Pushing, pulling –linked to the 
fact that the injured pushing the chalk block with force  
  
Installing the device to stop functioning equipment at the time of 
the door opening  
 
Operator training in case of anomaly in the operation of the mill 
bar 
6 
3 EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Tipology -  Work Evaluation of the choice of the solutions adopted 5 
Equipment [instrumentation, equipment, localized systems of 
transport energy (eg. power cables, ...)] - related to the unblocking of 
the material in the feeding of the mill 
EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Tipology - 
Devices (command and control, signaling, security) - related to the 
unblocking of the material in the feeding of the mill and to the block of 
the machine at the time of the opening of the intervention window   
AUDIT, SUPERVISION, OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT - Procedure - 
Procedures for workers, Procedures for machine operators, Procedures 
- related to the fact that he was not present any specific control 
problems procedure  
REVISION AND UPDATING OF THE SYSTEM, AND MAINTENANCE – 
operating condition – Verification functionality before to use – related 
to the fact that the grind is interrupted and then resumed without 
permission 
4 
EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – related to 
equipments and control devices of bar mill; 
AUDIT, SUPERVISION, OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT – related to the 
absence of procedures for different levels of emercy situation   
REVISION AND UPDATING OF THE SYSTEM, AND MAINTENANCE – 
related to verify functionality before to use 
MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT AND PROVISIONAL WORKS – 
equipments used and control devices of machine used for the 
work  
AUDIT, SUPERVISION AND OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT - 
information, education and training of every level of worker; 
behavioural and operational procedure; supervision of the 
worker    
 REVISION, UPDATING AND MAINTENANCES – verification of 
functionality before to use and upgrade of procedure and 
formation 
4 
5.1 
Failure block of the mill to the opening of the intervention door - 
failure of safety equipment systems for any deviation  
Equipment not suitable for the task of unblocking the mill 
Plant / technologies solutions for the residual risks 
management of individual current operational situations (vs. 
the progress of technology and knowledge)  – related to the 
adjustment of the control device of interruption operation of 
the mill when the interventions door opens and definition of the 
equipment to be used for the unblocking  
Detection / signal / alarm deviations systems (emergencies) 
external or internal (from process deviations) – related to the 
inclusion of the breaking device operating 
3 
5.2 
no specific procedures for operators at different levels on the activities 
to be carried out  
No information, education and training  
no supervision and  procedures both operational and behavioral 
deficient  
A. Definition of the working phases and the contingent 
operations for the subjects (to the several levels)  
(establishment of procedures for the use and maintenance of 
the mill bar and supervisor control) 
B. Operational procedures for the current operating 
conditions (Signs of danger, prohibition and obligation: call 
procedure) (danger signalling of moving machine and 
illustration of an intervention procedure in the case of filling of 
the mill bar) 
2 
6 
Hazard factor not identified (choice of H.I. technique not appropriate 
for the context) 
Definition of the applicable updates to the situation and any 
subsequent actions 1 
 
Insertion of the data input 
 
Figure 25: Identifying details of the events 
 
 
Figure 26: Injured Data 
 
 
Figure 27: Enterprise of injured  
 
 
Figure 28: Risks analysis of injured enterprise  
 
Figure 29: Injury consequence 
 
 
Figure 30: Injury Informations  
 
Also for this case it have not been able to completely fill all the cards, due to 
incomplete information, and moreover to respect the privacy lot of data have 
been made unreadable and for the people have been insert fantasy name 
Selection of the Causes and of the Interventions 
 
By analyzing thoroughly the material available, they have been obtained important 
information that allows to identify the accident causes and interventions closely 
linked. In summary: 
 
SEVERITY AND TYPE OF INJURY: Death  for crushing of whole body; the victim 
presented the results of mechanical activity (rotor bar and impact plate of the 
crusher) with a politraumatisme of right lower limb and of his skull which appeared 
non-existent.  
DIRECT CAUSE: Struck by object in rotation, motion, movement –movement of the 
impact bars and plates of crusher 
INDIRECT CAUSES OF FIRST LEVEL:  
 BREAKAGE, BURSTING, SPLITTING, SLIPPING, FALL, COLLAPSE OF MATERIAL 
AGENT - Breakage, bursting - causing splinters (wood, glass, metal, stone, 
plastic, others  - chalks blocks. 
 LOSS OF CONTROL (TOTAL OR PARTIAL) OF MACHINE, MEANS OF TRANSPORT 
OR HANDLING EQUIPMENT, HAND-HELD TOOL, OBJECT, ANIMAL - Loss of 
control (total or partial) - of machine (including unwanted start-up) or of the 
material being worked by the machine –linked to the fact that crushing was 
blocked and then resumed; 
 SLIPPING - STUMBLING AND FALLING - FALL OF PERSONS - Fall of person - to a 
lower level –  related to the fact that the person is precipitated in the mill bar 
following the unblocking 
 BODY MOVEMENT UNDER OR WITH PHYSICAL STRESS (GENERALLY LEADING 
TO AN INTERNAL INJURY) - Pushing, pulling –linked to the fact that the injured 
pushing the chalk block with force  
INDIRECT CAUSES OF SECOOND LEVEL: 
 EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Tipology -  
Work Equipment [instrumentation, equipment, localized systems of 
transport energy (eg. power cables, ...)] - related to the unblocking 
of the material in the feeding of the mill 
 EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Tipology - 
Devices (command and control, signaling, security) - related to the 
unblocking of the material in the feeding of the mill and to the block 
of the machine at the time of the opening of the intervention 
window   
 AUDIT, SUPERVISION, OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT - Procedure - 
Procedures for workers, Procedures for machine operators, 
Procedures - related to the fact that he was not present any specific 
control problems procedure  
 REVISION AND UPDATING OF THE SYSTEM, AND MAINTENANCE – 
operating condition – Verification functionality before to use – 
related to the fact that the grind is interrupted and then resumed 
without permission 
ROOT CAUSES:  
 EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – 
related to equipments and control devices of bar mill; 
 AUDIT, SUPERVISION, OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT – 
related to the absence of procedures for different levels of 
emercy situation   
 REVISION AND UPDATING OF THE SYSTEM, AND 
MAINTENANCE – related to verify functionality before to use 
 
Figure 31: Causes Analysis  
TECHNIQUE INTERVENTIONS: 
 Plant / technologies solutions for the residual risks 
management of individual current operational situations (vs. 
the progress of technology and knowledge)  – related to the 
adjustment of the control device of interruption operation 
of the mill when the interventions door opens and definition 
of the equipment to be used for the unblocking  
 Detection / signal / alarm deviations systems (emergencies) 
external or internal (from process deviations) – related to 
the inclusion of the breaking device operating 
WORK PLANNING AND PROCEDURE INTERVENTIONS: 
 Definition of the working phases and the contingent 
operations for the subjects (to the several levels)  
(establishment of procedures for the use and maintenance 
of the mill bar and supervisor control) 
 Operational procedures for the current operating conditions 
(Signs of danger, prohibition and obligation: call procedure) 
(danger signalling of moving machine and illustration of an 
intervention procedure in the case of filling of the mill bar) 
 
Figure 32: Interventions analysis 
Also in this case all the intervention solutions should not be applied but only 
technological/ plant solutions for operating current situation (technological 
upgrading for the handling loads) and the information, education and training of 
the worker (associated with updating procedures following control systems 
changes). 
 
Figure 33: Interventions analysis resolved 
 
Figure 34: Graphic visualization of the analyzed event  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROOT CAUSES  INDIRECT CAUSES OF SECOND LEVEL 
External criticality 
- General criticality [boundary conditions ( eg. 
topography, climate, availability of services, 
sociological context)] 
- Specific criticality (seismicity, area exposed to floods, 
avalanches, ...) 
- General structural aspects (eg. general and local 
stability, allowable loads, materials, quality, efficiency, 
...) 
Structure - Specific structural Aspects [eg. Structural safety 
equipment, escape routes (eg fire escape) and safe 
places]  
1 Consistency with the uses 
- General Plants [eg.  distribution systems (production) 
of energy,  management systems of the general 
environmental conditions (eg, heating, cooling, air 
exchange, lighting,...), communication systems] Common Plant 
2 Specific Pants (systems of emergency management, 
detection, contrast and alarm) 
STRUCTURAL AND PLANT 
INTERNAL / EXTERNAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Structure maintenance - Conservation work - Participation of adaptation to the norms 
Typology 
- Machine [tool, operator, auxiliary (eg. pollutant 
collection systems, cooling, heating, ...)]  
- Work Equipment [instrumentation, equipment, 
localized systems of transport energy (eg. power cables, 
...)]  
- Machinery and transport equipment  
- Devices (command and control, signaling, security)  
- Works provisional (eg. scaffolding, ...) 
EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) 
AND TEMPORARY WORKS 
Choice and conditions of use 
- Suitability to he development of specific operations in 
the context  
- Installation  
- How to use  
- Maintenance status 
AUDIT, SUPERVISION, 
OPERATING PROCEDURES & 
IFT 
Procedure 
- Audit ; 
- Supervision;  
- Procedures for workers;  
- Procedures for machine operators;  
- Procedures for personnel systems;  
- Procedures for supervisors;  
- Procedures for special operations personnel;  
- Information, formation and Training  
REVISION AND UPDATING OF 
THE SYSTEM, AND 
MAINTENANCE 
Operating conditions 
- Test 
- Verification functionality before to use 
- Types of maintenance applied  
- Revision  
- Updating systems 
Physical - chemical - biological  
critical of working environment 
- Raw materials and process products  
- Products resulting from process deviations  
- Chemical pollutants (solid, liquid, gaseous)  
- Physical pollutants (eg noise, vibration, 
electromagnetic fields and radiation, ...)  
- Biological agents (eg, viruses, bacteria, ...) 
PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL, 
BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF 
WORKPLACES 
Localized solutions for the 
management of environmental 
conditions 
- Environmental treatment (eg. thermal insulation, 
acoustic, ...)  
- Lighting  
- Massing available 
Ideological and subject aspects 
- Behaviour (available to any person to produce 
answers, determined from the environment, family 
regarding social situations, groups, and objects)  
- Position in relation to the duty cycle and the number of 
shifts  
- Relationships with supervisors and subordinates  
- Contract / employment 
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND 
IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF 
THE SUBJECTS INVOLVED 
physiological Aspects 
- Age  
- Work Experience  
- Conditions of health  
- Psycho-physical state (eg, depressed, sleepy, drunk, 
drugged, ...)  
- Attitude (predisposition for a particular mental or 
physical activity) 
INTERFERENCE OF 
FUNCTIONAL VOLUMES 
 Mecanical systems 
 Mec. sist..- operator 
 Operator - operator 
Use of functional volumes 
- Vehicles / machinery / plant / equipment in motion, 
controlled by operator  
- Vehicles / machinery / plant / equipment, automated 
motion (controlled by PLC)  
- Workers on the move 
TECHNIQUE INTERVETIONS 
Structural, plant and technology solutions for 
the workplace management   
Plant / technologies solutions for the residual 
risks management of individual current 
operational situations (vs. the progress of 
technology and knowledge)  
Technological/Plant solutions for interference 
management: current operational situations  
Detection / signal / alarm deviations systems 
(emergencies) external or internal (from process 
deviations)  
Technological / plant solutions contrast 
deviations (emergencies) external or internal 
(from process deviations) and provided means 
intervention 
WORK PLANNING AND PROCEDURAL 
INTERVWENTIONS 
Definition of the working phases and the 
contingent operations for the subjects (to the 
several levels)  
Procedures for checking presence  
Procedures of the action of the preplaces to the 
several levels  
Operational procedures for the current 
operating conditions (Signs of danger, 
prohibition and obligation: call procedure)  
Procedures of verification, control and 
detection / reporting / management of 
elementary functional anomalies 
Procedures for ordinary and extraordinary 
maintenance of sites / facilities / equipment 
including emergency management internal / 
external  
Procedures for the detection / warning / alarm 
emergencies external or internal (from process 
deviations)  
Operating procedures in emergency situations 
internal or external (uncontrollable evolution 
process) - Signs of Emergency (call procedure),  
Operating Procedures contrast of external 
(emergencies) or internal deviation (process 
deviations) - emergency intervention teams 
AND 
OR 
Implementation of 
risk assessment 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
SEARCH CAUSES EVENT 
DEFINITION PREVENTIVE  MEASURES 
  
 
 
 
 
 
INDIRECT CAUSES OF FIRST LEVEL 
Deviation due to electrical 
problems, explosion, fire 
- Electrical problem caused by a plant failure  
- Electrical problem caused by static electricity  
- Electrical problem caused by missing insulation  
- Electrical problem caused by external radiation / lightning  
- Explosion  
- Fire  
- Another case relating to electrical problems, explosion, fire 
overflow, overturn, leak, flow, 
vaporisation, emission 
- Solid state - overflowing, overturning 
- Liquid state - leaking, oozing, flowing, splashing, spraying 
- Gaseous state - vaporisation, aerosol formation, gas formation 
- Pulverulent material - smoke generation, dust/particles in 
suspension/emission of 
- Another case relating to  overflow, overturn, leak, flow, 
vaporisation, emission 
Breakage, bursting, splitting, 
slipping, fall, collapse of Material 
Agent 
- Break of material, at junctions, connections, material agent  
- Break / release of personal protective equipment  
- Break with explosion of splinters (wood, glass, metal, stone, 
plastic, etc.) agent material  
- Another case involving rupture, fracture, rupture violent, 
sudden and loud agent material 
Slipping, falling, loss of stability, 
collapse agent material 
- Slip, fall, loss of stability, collapse of Material Agent placed 
above (which falls on the victim)  
- Sliding, fall, loss of stability, collapse of agent material placed 
below (which drags the victim)  
- Slip, fall, loss of stability, the collapse of a material agent - at 
the same level  
- Another case relating to slipping, falling, loss of stability, 
collapse agent material 
Loss of control (total or partial) of 
machine, means of transport or 
handling equipment, hand-held 
tool, object, animal 
- Problems of total or partial control of the machine (including 
the unintended equipment) as well as the processed material  
- Problems of total or partial control of the means of transport / 
equipment material handling and / or substance (motorized or 
not)  
- Problems of total or partial control of a means of transport / 
handling of people and / or animals  
- Problems of total or partial control of hand tool (motorized or 
not) as well as the material machined by  
- Problems of total or partial control of object (led, moved, 
moved, etc.).  
- Problems of total or partial control of animal  
- Another cause of problems related to total or partial control of 
machinery, transportation / handling equipment, hand tools or 
objects, animals 
Slipping - Stumbling and falling - 
Fall of persons 
- Fall of person from the top through the opening  
- Slipping or tripping - with the fall of man - from  
- Slipping or tripping - with the fall of person - at the same level  
- Loss of balance - with the fall of man - from  
- Loss of balance - with the fall of person - at the same level  
- Slipping or tripping on machinery  
- Another case involving slipping or tripping, loss of balance - 
with the fall of person 
Body movement without any 
physical stress 
- Walking on a sharp object  
- Kneel, sit, lean against  
- Being grabbed, dragged, or moved by something from their 
momentum  
- Uncoordinated movements, gestures, inopportune, 
inappropriate  
- Another cause relative movement of the body without physical 
exertion (which usually leads to an external injury) 
Body movement under or with 
physical stress 
- Lifting, carrying or standing  
- Pushing, pulling, pulling  
- Depositing, dropping  
- Twisting, turning, turning  
- Step false twisting of the leg or ankle, slipping without falling  
- Another cause relative movement of the body during physical 
exertion (which usually leads to an internal injury) 
Shock, fright, violence, aggression, 
threat, presence 
- Surprise, fear  
- Violence, aggression, threat - including employees of the  
- Violence, aggression, threat-from people external to the 
company to the victims in the context of their function (bank 
robbery, assaulting bus drivers, etc.).  
- Aggression, mobs, violence by animals  
- Presence of the victim or a third party that creates in itself a 
danger to the victim / for himself and if any other  
- Another case involving surprise, fright, violence, aggression, 
threat, presence 
DIRECT CAUSE 
Contact with electric current, 
temperature 
 
- Indirect contact with the electrical circuit, 
lightning (passive)  
- Direct contact with electricity, suffer an 
electric discharge in the body  
- Contact with flame or object / warm or red-
hot  
- Contact with object or cold or frozen  
- Another case involving contact with electric 
current, temperature 
Contact with other material or 
substance 
- Contact with hazardous substances for 
nasal, oral, inhalation  
- Contact with hazardous substances through 
the skin or eyes  
- Contact with hazardous substances through 
the digestive system, swallowing or eating  
- Drowning in a liquid  
- Burial under a solid  
- Immersion in a gas, in a suspension of 
particles  
- Another case involving contact with material 
or substance 
Crushing  vertically and / or 
horizontally moving, fall on / against 
an immovable object / ground 
(victim in motion) 
- Vertical motion, crash on / against (the 
result of a fall)  
- Horizontal motion, crash on / against  
- Another case involving crushing  vertical 
and / or horizontal moving, fall on / against 
an immovable object / ground (victim in 
motion) 
Struck by moving object, collisions 
with 
- Struck by object projected  
- Struck by falling object  
- Struck by object that oscillates  
- Struck by object in rotation, motion, 
displacement, including vehicles  
- Collision with a moving object, including 
vehicles - a collision with a person (the 
victim is moving)  
- Another case involving a collision by moving 
object, collision with 
contact with sharp material agent, 
pointed, hard, abrasive 
- Contact with a sharp Material Agent (knife / 
blade)  
- Contact with a sharp Material Agent (nail / 
sharp tool)  
- Contact agent with hard or abrasive 
material  
- Another case concerning materials in 
contact with agent edgy, sharp, hard, 
abrasive 
Nesting, trapping, crushing, 
crushing, pinching, etc.. 
- Nesting, trapping, crushing in / inside  
- Nesting, trapping, crushing under  
- Nesting, trapping, crushing between  
- Tearing, cutting of a member, a hand, a 
finger or more parts of the body  
- Constrict of whole body or of one or more 
parts of it  
- By pinching  
- Another case involving nesting, trapping, 
crushing, crushing, pinching, etc.. 
Physical or mental effort 
- Physical effort at the expense of the 
musculoskeletal system  
- Physical exertion caused by radiation, noise, 
light, pressure  
- Effort psychic, mental shock  
- Another case involving mental or physical 
effort 
Bite, calcium, etc., by animals or 
humans 
-  Bite  
- Puncture by insects or fish  
- Shot, football, head, strangulation  
- Another case relating to bite, kick, etc., by 
animals or humans 
112 
SEVERITY 
and 
TYPE OF INJURY 
(medical report data) 
 
Death  for crushing 
of whole body 
AND 
OR 
AND 
Analysis of accidents in the paper manufacturing sector 
 
Fatal injury for mechanical asphyxia mixed ("strangulation and immobilization chest") 
Figure: 35 Central “Sietta” affected by the 
event of accidents 
 
 
Figure 36: Boardwalk in the area siette (see the 
bag containing the remains of clothing which 
'was released the PO) 
 
Figure 37: geared motor assembly rod 
moved into the area suitable for a number of 
preliminary visual analysis 
 
Figure 38 evident traces of the original 
placement of the connecting rod - crank axis of 
the gearbox bolted into place with tilt and less 
eccentric crank 
 
 
Table 16: Technique of analysis applied to the event  
 RESEARCH CAUSES ADOPTION PREVENTIVE MEASURES  
    
 ED: 7500 ld  (death)  
Part of body injured: trunk and internal organs 
Type of injury: mixed mechanical asphyxia   
 ev. sist. protective passive / active (in the case given the severity 
of the accident) - to constrict the movement of the rod / crank - 
PPE protection would not solve the problem 
 
1 
NESTING, TRAPPING, CRUSHING, CRUSHING, PINCHING, ETC.– 
Constrict of whole body or of one or more parts of it – neck and 
chest crushing 
The P.O. at the time of emergency is limited to support his 
colleague, and to carry out the order him to him 7 
2 
BREAKAGE, BURSTING, SPLITTING, SLIPPING, FALL, COLLAPSE OF 
MATERIAL AGENT - Break of material, at junctions, connections, 
material agent - destruction of the bearing collar 
LOSS OF CONTROL (TOTAL OR PARTIAL) OF MACHINE, MEANS OF 
TRANSPORT OR HANDLING EQUIPMENT, HAND-HELD TOOL, 
OBJECT, ANIMAL - Problems of total or partial control of the means 
of transport / equipment material handling and / or substance 
(motorized or not) - crank mechanism that transmits the 
reciprocating motion to the system horizontal oscillating multi 
sprayer nozzle 
BODY MOVEMENT UNDER OR WITH PHYSICAL STRESS  – Pushing, 
pulling - Share of P.O. to try to remedy the malfunction of the 
transmission of the reciprocating sietta 
Control action on the safety of the plant installation and 
maintenance  
 
Vigilance on the part of those in charge and information, training 
of PO recently inserted in the activity 
6 
3 
STRUCTURAL AND PLANT INTERNAL / EXTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS - 
External criticality - General criticality [boundary conditions ( eg. 
topography, climate, availability of services, sociological context)]- 
related to the climatic conditions of the work environment in which it 
operated Part abuse 
STRUCTURAL AND PLANT INTERNAL / EXTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS – 
Common Plant - Specific Pants (systems of emergency management, 
Evaluation of the choice of the solutions adopted 5 
detection, contrast and alarm) -  related to the fact that the 
emergency stop button was not easily accessible and not blocked the 
progress of the whole machine, but only some parts of it; 
STRUCTURAL AND PLANT INTERNAL / EXTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS – 
Structure maintenance – Conservation work -  related to the fact that 
pieces have been recovered from the existing system, like the engine 
crank-connecting rod system, which had many flaws, and the gear 
that was in terms of improper maintenance 
STRUCTURAL AND PLANT INTERNAL / EXTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS – 
Structure maintenance – Participation of adaptation to the norms - 
related to the fact that the gear had been recovered without 
consideration of its seal that contained asbestos, and that the bearing 
crank was in poor condition 
EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Tipology - 
Devices (command and control, signaling, security) - related to the fact 
that the emergency stop button was not easily accessible and not 
blocked the progress of the whole machine, but only some parts of it 
EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Choice and 
condition of use – Maintenance status - related to the fact that the 
gearbox was in a state of improper service, and that the bearing crank 
was in poor condition 
PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF WORKPLACES - 
Localized solutions for the management of environmental conditions – 
lighting - related to visibility problems in the operational area of the 
continous line 
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECTS 
INVOLVED - physiological Aspects  – work experience - linked to the 
fact that the P.O. had been included recently in the activity with the 
task of "guiding the chief engineer" for the purpose of learning the 
conduct of the paper machine 
AUDIT, SUPERVISION, OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT - Procedure - 
Procedures for workers, procedures for machine operators, Procedures 
for supervisors - related to the fact that it was not present no 
procedure for interventions in case of emergency on the continuous 
line 
REVISION AND UPDATING OF THE SYSTEM, AND MAINTENANCE – 
Operating conditions – Types of maintenance applied – related to lack 
of maintenance both in the workplace and the equipment 
4 
STRUCTURAL AND PLANT INTERNAL / EXTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS – 
related to general criticality, to the consistency with the uses and to 
actions to norms adaptation and specific systems for emergency 
management 
EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – related to the 
maintenance type and status of continous line and its equipments; 
PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE WORK 
ENVIRONMENT -  related to the lighting of the environment work 
PHYSIOLOGICAL, SUBJECTIVE AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS – related 
to the work experience of the injured; 
AUDIT, SUPERVISION AND OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT - related 
to the fact that it was not present no procedure 
REVISION AND UPDATING OF THE SYSTEM, AND MAINTENANCE –  
related to maintenance 
EXTERNAL/INTERNAL STRUCTURAL AND PLANT 
CHARACTERISTICS –work environment 
MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT AND PROVISIONAL WORKS - 
equipment used for processing 
PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE 
WORK ENVIRONMENT – related to working conditions in the 
workplace 
PHYSIOLOGICAL, SUBJECTIVE AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS – 
Type of employment contract, choice of workers, work 
experience 
AUDIT, SUPERVISION AND OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT - 
information, training and operator training at various levels, 
both operational and behavioral procedures, supervision of the 
worker by the Head 
4 
5.1 
poor maintenance of the workplace  
lack of maintenance of the equipment  
failure of safety equipment systems for maintenance activities 
A. Plant / technologies solutions for the residual risks 
management of individual current operational situations (vs. 
the progress of technology and knowledge) (related to all Root 
Causes identified); 
B. Detection / signal / alarm deviations systems (emergencies) 
external or internal (from process deviations) - (related to the 
difficulties of finding a PO and linked to the external and 
internal structural characteristics of the continuous line); 
3 
5.2 
no procedures for the operators at different levels on the activities to 
be carried out in case of emergency  
failure to provide information, education and training  
no supervision / operational and behavioural procedures deficient   
operation not provided and not analyzed  
A. Definition of operational procedures for emergency 
conditions (related to machinery, equipment and temporary 
works); 
B. Procedures for ordinary and extraordinary maintenance of 
sites / facilities / equipment including emergency 
management internal / external  (related to machinery, 
equipment and temporary works); 
C. Procedures of verification, control and detection / 
reporting / management of elementary functional anomalies 
(related to the definition of working procedures and 
consequent information, education and training) 
2 
6 
Hazard factor not identified (choice of H.I. technique not appropriate 
for the context) 
Definition of the technical maintenance of equipment and the 
organization of society at various levels 1 
 
 
Insertion of the data input 
 
Figure 39: Identifying details of the events 
 
 
Figure 40: Injured Data 
 
 
Figure 41: Enterprise of injured 
 
 
Figure 42: Risks analysis of injured enterprise 
 
 
Figure 43: Injury consequences 
 
 
Figure 44: Injury informations  
 
Also for this case it have not been able to completely fill all the cards, due to 
incomplete information, and moreover to respect the privacy lot of data have 
been made unreadable and for the people have been insert fantasy name 
Selection of the Causes and of the Interventions 
To summarize:  
SEVERITY AND TYPE OF INJURY: mechanical asphyxia mixed ("strangulation 
and immobilization chest"). 
DIRECT CAUSES: nesting, trapping, crushing, crushing, pinching, etc.– Constrict 
of whole body or of one or more parts of it – neck and chest crushing. 
 
INDIRECT CAUSES OF FIRST LEVEL:  
 BREAKAGE, BURSTING, SPLITTING, SLIPPING, FALL, COLLAPSE OF MATERIAL 
AGENT - Break of material, at junctions, connections, material agent - 
destruction of the bearing collar 
 LOSS OF CONTROL (TOTAL OR PARTIAL) OF MACHINE, MEANS OF 
TRANSPORT OR HANDLING EQUIPMENT, HAND-HELD TOOL, OBJECT, 
ANIMAL - Problems of total or partial control of the means of transport / 
equipment material handling and / or substance (motorized or not) - crank 
mechanism that transmits the reciprocating motion to the system 
horizontal oscillating multi sprayer nozzle 
 BODY MOVEMENT UNDER OR WITH PHYSICAL STRESS  – Pushing, pulling - 
Share of P.O. to try to remedy the malfunction of the transmission of the 
reciprocating sietta 
INDIRECT CAUSES OF SECOOND LEVEL: 
 STRUCTURAL AND PLANT INTERNAL / EXTERNAL 
CHARACTERISTICS - External criticality - General criticality 
[boundary conditions ( eg. topography, climate, availability of 
services, sociological context)]- related to the climatic conditions 
of the work environment in which it operated Part abuse 
 STRUCTURAL AND PLANT INTERNAL / EXTERNAL 
CHARACTERISTICS – Common Plant - Specific Pants (systems of 
emergency management, detection, contrast and alarm) -  
related to the fact that the emergency stop button was not 
easily accessible and not blocked the progress of the whole 
machine, but only some parts of it; 
 STRUCTURAL AND PLANT INTERNAL / EXTERNAL 
CHARACTERISTICS – Structure maintenance – Conservation work 
-  related to the fact that pieces have been recovered from the 
existing system, like the engine crank-connecting rod system, 
which had many flaws, and the gear that was in terms of 
improper maintenance 
 STRUCTURAL AND PLANT INTERNAL / EXTERNAL 
CHARACTERISTICS – Structure maintenance – Participation of 
adaptation to the norms - related to the fact that the gear had 
been recovered without consideration of its seal that contained 
asbestos, and that the bearing crank was in poor condition 
 EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Tipology - 
Devices (command and control, signaling, security) - related to 
the fact that the emergency stop button was not easily 
accessible and not blocked the progress of the whole machine, 
but only some parts of it 
 EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Choice 
and condition of use – Maintenance status - related to the fact 
that the gearbox was in a state of improper service, and that the 
bearing crank was in poor condition 
 PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF WORKPLACES - 
Localized solutions for the management of environmental 
conditions – lighting - related to visibility problems in the 
operational area of the continous line 
 PHYSIOLOGICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECTS 
INVOLVED - physiological Aspects  – work experience - linked to 
the fact that the P.O. had been included recently in the activity 
with the task of "guiding the chief engineer" for the purpose of 
learning the conduct of the paper machine 
 AUDIT, SUPERVISION, OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT - 
Procedure - Procedures for workers, procedures for machine 
operators, Procedures for supervisors - related to the fact that it 
was not present no procedure for interventions in case of 
emergency on the continuous line 
 REVISION AND UPDATING OF THE SYSTEM, AND MAINTENANCE 
– Operating conditions – Types of maintenance applied – related 
to lack of maintenance both in the workplace and the 
equipment 
 
ROOT CAUSES:  
 STRUCTURAL AND PLANT INTERNAL / EXTERNAL 
CHARACTERISTICS – related to general criticality, to the 
consistency with the uses and to actions to norms 
adaptation and specific systems for emergency 
management 
 EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – 
related to the maintenance type and status of continous 
line and its equipments; 
 PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE 
WORK ENVIRONMENT -  related to the lighting of the 
environment work 
 PHYSIOLOGICAL, SUBJECTIVE AND IDEOLOGICAL 
ASPECTS – related to the work experience of the injured; 
 AUDIT, SUPERVISION AND OPERATING PROCEDURES & 
IFT - related to the fact that it was not present no 
procedure 
 REVISION AND UPDATING OF THE SYSTEM, AND 
MAINTENANCE –  related to maintenance 
 
Figure 45: Cause analysis 
TECHNIQUE INTERVENTIONS: 
 Plant / technologies solutions for the residual risks 
management of individual current operational situations 
(vs. the progress of technology and knowledge) (related 
to all Root Causes identified); 
 Detection / signal / alarm deviations systems 
(emergencies) external or internal (from process 
deviations) - (related to the difficulties of finding a PO 
and linked to the external and internal structural 
characteristics of the continuous line); 
WORK PLANNING AND PROCEDURE INTERVENTIONS: 
 Definition of operational procedures for emergency 
conditions (related to machinery, equipment and 
temporary works); 
 Procedures for ordinary and extraordinary maintenance 
of sites / facilities / equipment including emergency 
management internal / external  (related to machinery, 
equipment and temporary works); 
 Procedures of verification, control and detection / 
reporting / management of elementary functional 
anomalies (related to the definition of working 
procedures and consequent information, education and 
training) 
 Operational procedures for the current operating 
conditions (Signs of danger, prohibition and obligation: 
call procedure) (danger signalling of moving machine and 
illustration of an intervention procedure in the case of 
filling of the mill bar) 
 
Figure 46: Interventions analysis 
From the graph it also gets the optimal solution of intervention, which 
includes:  
 
Figure 47: Interventions analysis resolved  
 
Figure 48:Graphic visualization of the analyzed event  
 
                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROOT CAUSES  CAUSE INDIRETTE II° LIVELLO 
Criticità esterne 
- Criticità generali [condizioni al contorno (es. 
topografiche, climatiche, di disponibilità di 
servizi, contesto sociologico,...)] 
- Criticità specifiche (sismicità dell'area, area 
esposta ad inondazioni, valanghe,...) 
- Aspetti strutturali generali (es. stabilità 
generale e locale, carichi ammissibili, 
materiali, qualità energetica,...) 
Strutture - Aspetti strutturali specifici [es. dotazioni 
strutturali di sicurezza, vie di fuga (es. scala 
antincendio) e luoghi sicuri] 
- Coerenza con le destinazioni d'uso 
- Impianti generali [es. sistemi di distribuzione 
(produzione) delle energie,  sistemi di gestione 
delle condizioni ambientali generali (es. 
riscaldamento, raffreddamento, ricambio di 
aria,  illuminazione,...), sistemi di 
comunicazione]  
Impianti comuni 
- Impianti specifici (sistemi di gestione delle 
emergenze, di rilevamento,  di contrasto e di 
allarme) 
CARATTERISTICHE 
(STRUTTURALI ED 
IMPIANTISTICHE) 
ESTERNE/INTERNE 
Manutenzione delle strutture - Interventi conservativi - Interventi di adeguamento alle norme 
Tipologia 
- Macchina [utensile, operatrice, ausiliaria (es. 
sistemi di captazione inquinanti, di 
raffreddamento, di riscaldamento,...)] 
- Attrezzatura di lavoro [strumentazione, 
equipaggiamento, sistemi localizzati di 
trasporto energie (es. cavi di alimentazioni,...)] 
- Macchine e mezzi di trasporto 
- Dispositivi (di comando, controllo e 
regolazione, segnalazione, protezione)  
- Opere provvisionali (es. ponteggi,...) 
ATTREZZATURE (MACCHINE) 
ED OPERE PROVVISIONALI 
Scelta e condizioni di utilizzo 
- Idoneità allo svolgimento delle   specifiche 
operazioni nel contesto 
- Installazione e collaudo 
- Modalità di impiego 
- Stato di manutenzione  
AUDIT, SUPERVISIONE, 
PROCEDURE OPERATIVE & IFT 
Procedure lavorative 
- Audit ; 
- Supervisione; 
- Procedure per lavoratori; 
- Procedure per operatori macchine; 
- Procedure per addetti impianti; 
- Procedure per preposti; 
- Procedure per addetti operazioni speciali; 
- Formazione informazione ed addestramento 
REVISIONE ED 
AGGIORNAMENTO DI 
SISTEMA, E MANUTENZIONE 
condizioni di gestione 
- Collaudo 
- Verifica funzionalità prima dell'uso 
- Tipologie di manutenzione applicate 
- Revisione  
- Aggiornamento dei sistemi 
Criticità chimico - fisico -  
biologiche dell'ambiente di 
lavoro 
- Materie prime e prodotti di processo 
- Prodotti risultanti da deviazioni di processo 
- Inquinanti chimici (solidi, liquidi, gassosi) 
- Inquinanti fisici (es. rumori, vibrazioni, campi 
elettromagnetici e radiazioni,...) 
- Agenti biologici (es. virus, batteri,...) 
ASPETTI CHIMICI - FISICI - 
BIOLOGICI DEI LUOGHI DI 
LAVORO 
Soluzioni localizzate 
di gestione delle condizioni 
ambientali 
- Trattamento ambientale (es. isolamento 
termico, acustico,...) 
- Illuminazione 
- Volumetrie disponibili 
Aspetti soggettivi  
ed ideologici 
- Atteggiamento (disposizione di ogni persona di 
produrre risposte, determinate dall'am-biente 
familiare, sociale riguardo a situazioni, gruppi 
e oggetti) 
- Posizione nei confronti del ciclo di lavoro e 
delle turnazioni 
- Rapporti con i preposti e i subordinati 
- Contratto/rapporto di lavoro 
ASPETTI FISIOLOGICI ED 
IDEOLOGICI DEI SOGGETTI 
COINVOLTI 
Aspetti fisiologici 
- Età  
- Esperienza lavorativa 
- Condizioni di salute 
- Stato psicofisico (es. depresso, sonnolento, 
ubriaco, drogato,...) 
- Attitudine (predisposizione per una particolare 
attività mentale o fisica) 
INTERFERENZE DI VOLUMI 
FUNZIONALI 
 sistemi meccanici 
 sist.mecc.- lavoratore 
 lavoratore - lavoratore 
Utilizzo dei volumi funzionali 
- Mezzi/macchine/i pianti/attrezzature in 
movimento, controllati da operatore 
- Mezzi/macchine/impianti/attrezzature, in 
movimento automatizzato (controllati da PLC) 
 Lavoratori in movimento 
INTERVENTI TECNICI 
Soluzioni strutturali, impiantistiche e 
tecnologiche per gestione dei luoghi di lavoro 
Soluzioni impiantistiche / tecnologiche per 
gestione dei rischi residui di singole 
situazioni operative correnti (vs progresso 
della tecnica e delle conoscenze) 
Soluzioni tecnologiche / impiantistiche per 
gestione interferenze: situazioni operative 
correnti 
Sistemi di rilevamento / segnalazione / 
allarme di deviazioni  (emergenze) esterne o 
interne  (da deviazioni di processo) 
Soluzioni  tecnologiche / impiantistiche di 
contrasto di deviazioni (emergenze) esterne o 
interne (da deviazioni di processo) e 
dotazione mezzi intervento 
 
INTERVENTI DI PROGRAMMAZIONE  
E PROCEDURALI 
Definizione delle fasi lavorative e delle 
operazioni contingenti per i soggetti (ai vari 
livelli) 
Procedure di verifica presenze 
Procedure di azione dei preposti ai vari livelli 
Procedure operative per situazioni operative 
correnti (Segnaletica di pericolo, di divieto e di 
obbligo: richiamo di  procedura operativa) 
Procedure di verifica, controllo ed 
individuazione / segnalazione / gestione di 
anomalie funzionali elementari 
Procedure di manutenzione ordinaria e 
straordinaria di luoghi / impianti / 
attrezzature compresi di presidi di gestione 
delle emergenze esterne / interne 
Procedure di individuazione / segnalazione / 
allarme di emergenze esterne o interne  (da 
deviazioni di processo) 
Procedure operative in situazioni di 
emergenze esterne o interne (evoluzioni 
incontrollabili di processo) - Segnaletica di 
emergenza (richiamo di  procedura operativa), 
Procedure operative di contrasto di 
deviazione esterne (emergenze) o interne 
(deviazioni di processo ) – intervento squadre 
di emergenza 
AND 
OR 
Attuazione della 
gestione dei rischi 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
RICERCA CAUSE EVENTO 
DEFINIZIONE MISURE PREVENTIVE 
  
 
 
 
 
CAUSE INDIRETTE I° LIVELLO 
Problema elettrico, esplosione, 
incendio  
- Problema elettrico causato da un guasto all’impianto  
- Problema elettrico  causato da elettricità statica 
- Problema elettrico causato da mancato isolamento 
- Problema elettrico causato da radiazioni esterne/fulmine 
- Esplosione 
- Incendio 
- Altra causa relativa a problema elettrico, esplosione, incendio 
Traboccamento, rovesciamento, 
perdita, scorrimento, 
vaporizzazione, emanazione  
- Allo stato solido – rovesciamento, scorrimento 
- Allo stato liquido – perdita, trasudo, fuoriuscita, rovesciamento, 
traboccamento, spruzzo, aspersione 
- Allo stato gassoso – vaporizzazione, formazione di aerosol, 
formazione di gas, emanazione 
- Polverosità – generazione di fumi, emissione di polveri, 
particelle 
- Altra causa relativa a traboccamento, rovesciamento, perdita, 
scorrimento, vaporizzazione, emanazione 
Rottura, frattura, rottura violenta, 
improvvisa e fragorosa dell'agente 
materiale 
- Rottura di materiale, alle giunzioni, alle connessioni, dell’agente 
materiale 
- Rottura/sganciamento del dispositivo di protezione individuale 
- Rottura con esplosione di schegge (legno, vetro, metallo, pietra, 
plastica, altro) dell’agente materiale 
- Altra causa relativa a rottura, frattura, rottura violenta, 
improvvisa e fragorosa dell'agente materiale  
Scivolamento, caduta, perdita di 
stabilità, crollo dell'agente 
materiale 
- Scivolamento, caduta, perdita di stabilità, crollo di agente 
materiale posto al di sopra (che cade sulla vittima) 
- Scivolamento, caduta, perdita di stabilità, crollo di agente 
materiale posto al di sotto (che trascina la vittima) 
- Scivolamento, caduta,  perdita di stabilità, crollo di un agente 
materiale – allo stesso livello 
- Altra causa relativa a scivolamento, caduta, perdita di stabilità, 
crollo dell'agente materiale 
Problemi di controllo totale o 
parziale di macchine, mezzi di 
trasporto /attrezzature di 
movimentazione, utensili a mano o 
oggetti, animali 
- Problemi di controllo totale o parziale di macchina (ivi 
compreso l’avviamento intempestivo) nonché del materiale 
lavorato 
- Problemi di controllo totale o parziale di mezzo di trasporto/di 
attrezzatura di movimentazione di materiale e/o sostanza 
(motorizzato o no) 
- Problemi di controllo totale o parziale di un mezzo di 
trasporto/di movimentazione di persone e/o di animali 
- Problemi di controllo totale o parziale di utensile a mano 
(motorizzato o no) nonché del materiale lavorato dall’utensile 
- Problemi di controllo totale o parziale di oggetto (portato, 
spostato, movimentato, ecc.) 
- Problemi di controllo totale o parziale di animale 
- Altra causa relativa a problemi di controllo totale o parziale di 
macchine, mezzi di trasporto /attrezzature di movimentazione, 
utensili a mano o oggetti, animali  
Scivolamento o inciampamento, 
perdita dell'equilibrio - con caduta 
di persona  
- Caduta di persona dall'alto attraverso apertura  
- Scivolamento o inciampamento - con caduta di persona - 
dall'alto 
- Scivolamento o inciampamento – con caduta di persona – allo 
stesso livello 
- Perdita dell’equilibrio – con caduta di persona – dall’alto 
- Perdita dell’equilibrio – con caduta di persona – allo stesso 
livello 
- Scivolamento o inciampamento sul macchinario 
- Altra causa relativa a scivolamento o inciampamento, perdita 
dell'equilibrio - con caduta di persona  
Movimento del corpo senza sforzo 
fisico (che porta generalmente ad 
una lesione esterna)  
- Camminare su un oggetto tagliente 
- Inginocchiarsi, sedersi, poggiarsi contro 
- Essere afferrato, trascinato, spostato da qualcosa o dal proprio 
slancio 
- Movimenti scoordinati, gesti intempestivi, inopportuni 
- Altra causa relativa a movimento del corpo senza sforzo fisico 
(che porta generalmente ad una lesione esterna)  
Movimento del corpo sotto sforzo 
fisico (che porta generalmente ad 
una lesione interna)  
- Sollevando, portando o alzandosi 
- Spingendo, tirando, trainando 
- Depositando, abbassandosi 
- Torsione, rotazione, girandosi 
- Passo falso, torsione di gamba o caviglia, scivolamento senza 
caduta 
- Altra causa relativa a movimento del corpo sotto sforzo fisico 
(che porta generalmente ad una lesione interna)  
Sorpresa, spavento, violenza, 
aggressione, minaccia, presenza  
- Sorpresa, spavento 
- Violenza, aggressione, minaccia – tra dipendenti dell’impresa 
- Violenza, aggressione, minaccia–proveniente da persone esterne 
all’impresa verso le vittime nel quadro della loro funzione 
(rapina in banca, aggressione ad autisti di autobus, ecc.) 
- Aggressione, calca, violenza da parte di animali 
- Presenza della vittima o di un terzo che crea di per sé stesso un 
pericolo per la vittima/per sé stesso e se del caso per altri 
- Altra causa relativa a sorpresa, spavento, violenza, aggressione, 
minaccia, presenza  
CAUSE DIRETTE 
Contatto con corrente elettrica, 
temperatura  
- Contatto indiretto con circuito elettrico, 
fulmine (passivo) 
- Contatto diretto con elettricità, subire una 
scarica elettrica nel corpo 
- Contatto con fiamma viva o con 
oggetto/ambiente caldo o arroventato 
- Contatto con oggetto o ambiente freddo o 
ghiacciato 
- Altra causa relativa a contatto con corrente 
elettrica, temperatura  
Contatto con materiale o sostanza  
- Contatto con sostanze pericolose per via 
nasale, orale, per inalazione 
- Contatto con sostanze pericolose attraverso 
pelle o occhi 
- Contatto con sostanze pericolose attraverso 
il sistema digerente, inghiottendo o 
mangiando 
- Annegamento in un liquido 
- Seppellimento sotto un solido 
- Immersione in un gas, in una sospensione di 
particelle 
- Altro causa relativa a contatto con materiale 
o sostanza  
Schiacciamento in movimento 
verticale,  e/o orizzontale , caduta, 
su/contro un oggetto 
immobile/terreno (vittima in 
movimento)  
- Movimento verticale, schiacciamento 
su/contro (risultato di caduta) 
- Movimento orizzontale, schiacciamento 
su/contro 
- Altra causa relativa a schiacciamento in 
movimento verticale,  e/o orizzontale , 
caduta, su/contro un oggetto 
immobile/terreno (vittima in movimento)  
Urto da parte di oggetto in 
movimento, collisione con  
- Urto da parte di oggetto proiettato 
- Urto da parte di oggetto in caduta 
- Urto da parte di oggetto che oscilla  
- Urto da parte di oggetto in rotazione, 
movimento, spostamento, ivi inclusi i veicoli 
- Collisione con un oggetto in movimento, ivi 
inclusi i veicoli - collisione con una persona 
(la vittima è in movimento) 
- Altra causa relativa a urto da parte di 
oggetto in movimento, collisione con  
Contatto con agente materiale 
tagliente, appuntito, duro, abrasivo  
- Contatto con un agente materiale tagliente 
(coltello/lama) 
- Contatto con un agente materiale appuntito 
(chiodo/utensile acuminato) 
- Contatto con agente materiale duro o 
abrasivo 
- Altra causa relativa a contatto con agente 
materiale tagliente, appuntito, duro, 
abrasivo  
Incastramento, intrappolamento, 
schiacciamento, stritolamento, 
pizzicamento, ecc.  
- Incastramento, intrappolamento, 
schiacciamento in/dentro 
- Incastramento, intrappolamento, 
schiacciamento sotto 
- Incastramento, intrappolamento, 
schiacciamento fra 
- Strappo, sezionamento di un membro, di 
una mano, di un dito o di più parti del corpo 
- Stritolamento del corpo intero o di una o più 
parti di esso 
- Pizzicamento da 
- Altra causa relativa a incastramento, 
intrappolamento, schiacciamento, 
stritolamento, pizzicamento, ecc.  
Sforzo fisico o psichico  
- Sforzo fisico a carico del sistema muscolo-
scheletrico 
- Sforzo fisico causato da radiazioni, rumore, 
luce, pressione 
- Sforzo psichico, shock mentale 
- Altra causa relativa a sforzo fisico o psichico  
Morso, calcio, ecc, da parte di 
animali o di esseri umani  
- Morso 
- Puntura da insetti o pesci 
- Colpo, calcio, testata, strangolamento 
- Altra causa relativa a morso, calcio, ecc, da 
parte di animali o di esseri umani  
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Analysis of accidents in the agricultural activity sector 
 
Fatal accident occurred during a routine maintenance of a shovel excavator  
 
Figure 49: Front view of the blade material 
agent of the event 
 
 
Figure 50: Side view of the machinery of the 
injury  
 
 
 
Table 17: Technique of analysis applied to the event  
 RESEARCH CAUSES ADOPTION PREVENTIVE MEASURES  
    
 ED: 7500 ld  (death)  
Part of body injured: trunk and internal organs 
Type of injury: multiple trauma   
 ev. sist. protective passive / active (in the case given the 
severity of the accident) - Fall Bucket - PPE protection would 
not solve the problem 
 
1 STRUCK BY MOVING OBJECT, COLLISIONS WITH – Struck by falling object  – crushed by the shovel excavator fall 
The worker to the detection of a deviation of the functionality 
of equipment called the technical expertise and not using the 
failure equipment  
7 
2 
OVERFLOW, OVERTURN, LEAK, FLOW, VAPORISATION, EMISSION – 
Liquid state - leaking, oozing, flowing, splashing, spraying  - linked to 
the fact that the excavator bucket has undergone a release of oil 
from the installation of lifting of the blade; 
SLIPPING, FALLING, LOSS OF STABILITY, COLLAPSE AGENT MATERIAL - 
Slip, fall, loss of stability, collapse of Material Agent placed above 
(which falls on the victim) - linked to the fall of the blade on the 
victim. 
Inclusion of a system for the maintenance of equipment; 6 
3 
EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Tipology - 
Devices (command and control, signaling, security - related to the 
fact that the loss of oil in the lifting of the blade was not signaled by 
a light and there was not a lock command of the blade and related 
to the fact that there is a safety device to operate the maintenance; 
EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Choice and 
condition of use – How to use - related to the fact that the operator, 
because of the lack of clarity of the instructions and there was no 
sufficient training, had no idea of what actions were correct and 
which are not; 
EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Choice and 
condition of use – Maintenance status  - linked to the maintenance of 
the excavator bucket; 
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECTS 
INVOLVED – Ideological and subject Aspects  – employment 
contractor - linked to the type of contract that the operator had at 
the time of the accident; 
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECTS 
INVOLVED - physiological Aspects  – work experience - linked to the 
experience of the operator deficient for the maintenance operations; 
AUDIT, SUPERVISION, OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT - Procedure - 
Procedures for workers - related to non-existent procedures for 
routine work for every single operator for all its activities 
Evaluation of the choice of the solutions adopted 5 
4 
EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS - related to 
machinery and transport equipment, devices, operating instructions, 
maintenance status; 
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECTS 
INVOLVED - related to the type of employment contract  and to the 
work experience of the worker; 
AUDIT, SUPERVISION, OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT - related to the 
workers procedures. 
MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT AND PROVISIONAL WORKS - 
equipment used for processing 
PHYSIOLOGICAL, SUBJECTIVE AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS – 
Type of employment contract, choice of workers, work 
experience 
AUDIT, SUPERVISION AND OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT - 
information, training and operator training at various levels, 
operational and behavioural procedures, supervision of the 
worker  
4 
5.1 
lack of maintenance of the equipment  
failure of safety equipment systems for maintenance activities 
A. Technological / plant solutions contrast deviations 
(emergencies) external or internal (from process deviations) 
and provided means intervention  (related to the fact that it 
needs a signaling system of the bucket excavator deviations 
and consequently a intervention means to remedy the 
deviations); 
3 
5.2 
no operators procedures for the equipment maintenance (bucket 
excavator)  
no information, education and training  
no supervision / operational and behavioural procedures deficient  
operation not provided and not analyzed 
A. Procedures for ordinary and extraordinary maintenance 
of sites / facilities / equipment including emergency 
management internal / external - in the case of the 
maintenance degree and the lines to be followed for the 
machine in question 
B. Definition of the working phases and the contingent 
operations for the subjects (to the several levels)  (related 
work experience of P.O. and the definition of working 
procedures); 
C. Definition of the working phases and the contingent 
operations for the subjects (to the several levels)  – definition 
of operator / supervisors tasks and related information, 
education and training 
2 
6 
Hazard factor not identified (choice of H.I. technique not appropriate 
for the context) 
Definition of the technical maintenance of equipment and the 
organization of society at various levels 1 
 
Insertion of the  data input 
 
 
Figure 51: dentifying details of the events 
 
 
Figure 52: Injured data 
 
 
Figure 53: Enterprise of injured 
 
 
Figure 54: Risks analysis of injured enterprise 
 
 
Figure 55: Injury consequences 
 
 
Figure 56: Injured informations 
 
Also for this case it have not been able to completely fill all the cards, due to 
incomplete information, and moreover to respect the privacy lot of data have been 
made unreadable and for the people have been insert fantasy name 
Selection of the Causes and of the Interventions 
To summarize:  
SEVERITY AND TYPE OF INJURY: death as a result of internal injuries on the whole 
body (systemic effects) that resulted in a violent mechanical asphyxia from being 
crushed  
DIRECT CAUSES: STRUCK BY MOVING OBJECT, COLLISIONS WITH – Struck by falling 
object  – crushed by the shovel excavator fall  
INDIRECT CAUSES OF FIRST LEVEL:  
 OVERFLOW, OVERTURN, LEAK, FLOW, VAPORISATION, EMISSION – Liquid state - 
leaking, oozing, flowing, splashing, spraying  - linked to the fact that the 
excavator bucket has undergone a release of oil from the installation of lifting of 
the blade; 
 SLIPPING, FALLING, LOSS OF STABILITY, COLLAPSE AGENT MATERIAL - Slip, fall, 
loss of stability, collapse of Material Agent placed above (which falls on the 
victim) - linked to the fall of the blade on the victim. 
INDIRECT CAUSES OF SECOOND LEVEL: 
 EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Tipology - 
Devices (command and control, signaling, security - related to the fact 
that the loss of oil in the lifting of the blade was not signaled by a light 
and there was not a lock command of the blade and related to the 
fact that there is a safety device to operate the maintenance; 
 EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Choice and 
condition of use – How to use - related to the fact that the operator, 
because of the lack of clarity of the instructions and there was no 
sufficient training, had no idea of what actions were correct and 
which are not; 
 EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS – Choice and 
condition of use – Maintenance status  - linked to the maintenance of 
the excavator bucket; 
 PHYSIOLOGICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECTS 
INVOLVED – Ideological and subject Aspects  – employment 
contractor - linked to the type of contract that the operator had at the 
time of the accident; 
 PHYSIOLOGICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECTS 
INVOLVED - physiological Aspects  – work experience - linked to the 
experience of the operator deficient for the maintenance operations; 
 AUDIT, SUPERVISION, OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT - Procedure - 
Procedures for workers - related to non-existent procedures for 
routine work for every single operator for all its activities 
ROOT CAUSES:  
 EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) AND TEMPORARY WORKS - related 
to machinery and transport equipment, devices, operating 
instructions, maintenance status; 
 PHYSIOLOGICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECTS 
INVOLVED - related to the type of employment contract  and 
to the work experience of the worker; 
 AUDIT, SUPERVISION, OPERATING PROCEDURES & IFT - related 
to the workers procedures. 
 
Figure 57: Causes analysis 
TECHNIQUE INTERVENTIONS: 
 Technological / plant solutions contrast deviations 
(emergencies) external or internal (from process deviations) 
and provided means intervention  (related to the fact that it 
needs a signaling system of the bucket excavator deviations 
and consequently a intervention means to remedy the 
deviations); 
WORK PLANNING AND PROCEDURE INTERVENTIONS: 
 Procedures for ordinary and extraordinary maintenance of 
sites / facilities / equipment including emergency 
management internal / external - in the case of the 
maintenance degree and the lines to be followed for the 
machine in question 
 Definition of the working phases and the contingent 
operations for the subjects (to the several levels)  (related 
work experience of P.O. and the definition of working 
procedures); 
 Definition of the working phases and the contingent 
operations for the subjects (to the several levels)  – definition 
of operator / supervisors tasks and related information, 
education and training 
 
Figure 58: Interventions analysis 
Even in this case should not be applied all the intervention solutions, but only some 
of those proposals to eliminate the possibility to occur the chain of causes. 
Figure 59: Graphic visualization of the analyzed event 
 
                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROOT CAUSES  INDIRECT CAUSES OF SECOND LEVEL 
External criticality 
- General criticality [boundary conditions ( eg. 
topography, climate, availability of services, 
sociological context)] 
- Specific criticality (seismicity, area exposed to 
floods, avalanches, ...) 
- General structural aspects (eg. general and 
local stability, allowable loads, materials, 
quality, efficiency, ...) 
Structure - Specific structural Aspects [eg. Structural 
safety equipment, escape routes (eg fire escape) 
and safe places]  
- Consistency with the uses 
- General Plants [eg.  distribution systems 
(production) of energy,  management systems 
of the general environmental conditions (eg, 
heating, cooling, air exchange, lighting,...), 
communication systems] 
Common Plant 
- Specific Pants (systems of emergency 
management, detection, contrast and alarm) 
STRUCTURAL AND PLANT 
INTERNAL / EXTERNAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Structure maintenance - Conservation work - Participation of adaptation to the norms 
Typology 
- Machine [tool, operator, auxiliary (eg. 
pollutant collection systems, cooling, heating, 
...)]  
- Work Equipment [instrumentation, 
equipment, localized systems of transport 
energy (eg. power cables, ...)]  
- Machinery and transport equipment  
- Devices (command and control, signaling, 
security)  
- Works provisional (eg. scaffolding, ...) 
EQUIPMENT (MACHINES) 
AND TEMPORARY WORKS 
Choice and conditions of use 
- Suitability to he development of specific 
operations in the context  
- Installation  
- How to use  
- Maintenance status 
AUDIT, SUPERVISION, 
OPERATING PROCEDURES & 
IFT 
Procedure 
- Audit ; 
- Supervision;  
- Procedures for workers;  
- Procedures for machine operators;  
- Procedures for personnel systems;  
- Procedures for supervisors;  
- Procedures for special operations personnel;  
- Information, formation and Training  
REVISION AND UPDATING OF 
THE SYSTEM, AND 
MAINTENANCE 
Operating conditions 
- Test 
- Verification functionality before to use 
- Types of maintenance applied  
- Revision  
- Updating systems 
Physical - chemical - biological  
critical of working environment 
- Raw materials and process products  
- Products resulting from process deviations  
- Chemical pollutants (solid, liquid, gaseous)  
- Physical pollutants (eg noise, vibration, 
electromagnetic fields and radiation, ...)  
- Biological agents (eg, viruses, bacteria, ...) 
PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL, 
BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF 
WORKPLACES 
Localized solutions for the 
management of environmental 
conditions 
- Environmental treatment (eg. thermal 
insulation, acoustic, ...)  
- Lighting  
- Massing available 
Ideological and subject aspects 
- Behaviour (available to any person to produce 
answers, determined from the environment, 
family regarding social situations, groups, and 
objects)  
- Position in relation to the duty cycle and the 
number of shifts  
- Relationships with supervisors and 
subordinates  
- Contract / employment 
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND 
IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF 
THE SUBJECTS INVOLVED 
physiological Aspects 
- Age  
- Work Experience  
- Conditions of health  
- Psycho-physical state (eg, depressed, sleepy, 
drunk, drugged, ...)  
- Attitude (predisposition for a particular 
mental or physical activity) 
INTERFERENCE OF 
FUNCTIONAL VOLUMES 
 Mecanical systems 
 Mec. sist..- operator 
 Operator - operator 
Use of functional volumes 
- Vehicles / machinery / plant / equipment in 
motion, controlled by operator  
- Vehicles / machinery / plant / equipment, 
automated motion (controlled by PLC)  
- Workers on the move 
TECHNIQUE INTERVETIONS 
Structural, plant and technology solutions 
for the workplace management   
Plant / technologies solutions for the 
residual risks management of individual 
current operational situations (vs. the 
progress of technology and knowledge)  
Technological/Plant solutions for 
interference management: current 
operational situations  
Detection / signal / alarm deviations systems 
(emergencies) external or internal (from 
process deviations)  
Technological / plant solutions contrast 
deviations (emergencies) external or 
internal (from process deviations) and 
provided means intervention 
WORK PLANNING AND PROCEDURAL 
INTERVWENTIONS 
Definition of the working phases and the 
contingent operations for the subjects (to 
the several levels)  
Procedures for checking presence  
Procedures of the action of the preplaces to 
the several levels  
Operational procedures for the current 
operating conditions (Signs of danger, 
prohibition and obligation: call procedure)  
Procedures of verification, control and 
detection / reporting / management of 
elementary functional anomalies 
Procedures for ordinary and extraordinary 
maintenance of sites / facilities / equipment 
including emergency management internal / 
external  
Procedures for the detection / warning / 
alarm emergencies external or internal 
(from process deviations)  
Operating procedures in emergency 
situations internal or external 
(uncontrollable evolution process) - Signs of 
Emergency (call procedure),  
Operating Procedures contrast of external 
(emergencies) or internal deviation (process 
deviations) - emergency intervention teams 
AND 
OR 
Implementation of 
risk assessment 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
SEARCH CAUSES EVENT 
DEFINITION PREVENTIVE  MEASURES 
  
 
 
 
 
 
INDIRECT CAUSES OF FIRST LEVEL 
Deviation due to electrical 
problems, explosion, fire 
- Electrical problem caused by a plant failure  
- Electrical problem caused by static electricity  
- Electrical problem caused by missing insulation  
- Electrical problem caused by external radiation / lightning  
- Explosion  
- Fire  
- Another case relating to electrical problems, explosion, fire 
overflow, overturn, leak, flow, 
vaporisation, emission 
- Solid state - overflowing, overturning 
- Liquid state - leaking, oozing, flowing, splashing, spraying 
- Gaseous state - vaporisation, aerosol formation, gas formation 
- Pulverulent material - smoke generation, dust/particles in 
suspension/emission of 
- Another case relating to  overflow, overturn, leak, flow, 
vaporisation, emission 
Breakage, bursting, splitting, 
slipping, fall, collapse of Material 
Agent 
- Break of material, at junctions, connections, material agent  
- Break / release of personal protective equipment  
- Break with explosion of splinters (wood, glass, metal, stone, 
plastic, etc.) agent material  
- Another case involving rupture, fracture, rupture violent, 
sudden and loud agent material 
Slipping, falling, loss of stability, 
collapse agent material 
- Slip, fall, loss of stability, collapse of Material Agent placed 
above (which falls on the victim)  
- Sliding, fall, loss of stability, collapse of agent material placed 
below (which drags the victim)  
- Slip, fall, loss of stability, the collapse of a material agent - at 
the same level  
- Another case relating to slipping, falling, loss of stability, 
collapse agent material 
Loss of control (total or partial) of 
machine, means of transport or 
handling equipment, hand-held 
tool, object, animal 
- Problems of total or partial control of the machine (including 
the unintended equipment) as well as the processed material  
- Problems of total or partial control of the means of transport / 
equipment material handling and / or substance (motorized or 
not)  
- Problems of total or partial control of a means of transport / 
handling of people and / or animals  
- Problems of total or partial control of hand tool (motorized or 
not) as well as the material machined by  
- Problems of total or partial control of object (led, moved, 
moved, etc.).  
- Problems of total or partial control of animal  
- Another cause of problems related to total or partial control of 
machinery, transportation / handling equipment, hand tools or 
objects, animals 
Slipping - Stumbling and falling - 
Fall of persons 
- Fall of person from the top through the opening  
- Slipping or tripping - with the fall of man - from  
- Slipping or tripping - with the fall of person - at the same level  
- Loss of balance - with the fall of man - from  
- Loss of balance - with the fall of person - at the same level  
- Slipping or tripping on machinery  
- Another case involving slipping or tripping, loss of balance - 
with the fall of person 
Body movement without any 
physical stress 
- Walking on a sharp object  
- Kneel, sit, lean against  
- Being grabbed, dragged, or moved by something from their 
momentum  
- Uncoordinated movements, gestures, inopportune, 
inappropriate  
- Another cause relative movement of the body without physical 
exertion (which usually leads to an external injury) 
Body movement under or with 
physical stress 
- Lifting, carrying or standing  
- Pushing, pulling, pulling  
- Depositing, dropping  
- Twisting, turning, turning  
- Step false twisting of the leg or ankle, slipping without falling  
- Another cause relative movement of the body during physical 
exertion (which usually leads to an internal injury) 
Shock, fright, violence, aggression, 
threat, presence 
- Surprise, fear  
- Violence, aggression, threat - including employees of the  
- Violence, aggression, threat-from people external to the 
company to the victims in the context of their function (bank 
robbery, assaulting bus drivers, etc.).  
- Aggression, mobs, violence by animals  
- Presence of the victim or a third party that creates in itself a 
danger to the victim / for himself and if any other  
- Another case involving surprise, fright, violence, aggression, 
threat, presence 
DIRECT CAUSE 
Contact with electric current, 
temperature 
 
- Indirect contact with the electrical circuit, 
lightning (passive)  
- Direct contact with electricity, suffer an 
electric discharge in the body  
- Contact with flame or object / warm or red-
hot  
- Contact with object or cold or frozen  
- Another case involving contact with electric 
current, temperature 
Contact with other material or 
substance 
- Contact with hazardous substances for 
nasal, oral, inhalation  
- Contact with hazardous substances through 
the skin or eyes  
- Contact with hazardous substances through 
the digestive system, swallowing or eating  
- Drowning in a liquid  
- Burial under a solid  
- Immersion in a gas, in a suspension of 
particles  
- Another case involving contact with material 
or substance 
Crushing  vertically and / or 
horizontally moving, fall on / against 
an immovable object / ground 
(victim in motion) 
- Vertical motion, crash on / against (the 
result of a fall)  
- Horizontal motion, crash on / against  
- Another case involving crushing  vertical 
and / or horizontal moving, fall on / against 
an immovable object / ground (victim in 
motion) 
Struck by moving object, collisions 
with 
- Struck by object projected  
- Struck by falling object  
- Struck by object that oscillates  
- Struck by object in rotation, motion, 
displacement, including vehicles  
- Collision with a moving object, including 
vehicles - a collision with a person (the 
victim is moving)  
- Another case involving a collision by moving 
object, collision with 
contact with sharp material agent, 
pointed, hard, abrasive 
- Contact with a sharp Material Agent (knife / 
blade)  
- Contact with a sharp Material Agent (nail / 
sharp tool)  
- Contact agent with hard or abrasive 
material  
- Another case concerning materials in 
contact with agent edgy, sharp, hard, 
abrasive 
Nesting, trapping, crushing, 
crushing, pinching, etc.. 
- Nesting, trapping, crushing in / inside  
- Nesting, trapping, crushing under  
- Nesting, trapping, crushing between  
- Tearing, cutting of a member, a hand, a 
finger or more parts of the body  
- Constrict of whole body or of one or more 
parts of it  
- By pinching  
- Another case involving nesting, trapping, 
crushing, crushing, pinching, etc.. 
Physical or mental effort 
- Physical effort at the expense of the 
musculoskeletal system  
- Physical exertion caused by radiation, noise, 
light, pressure  
- Effort psychic, mental shock  
- Another case involving mental or physical 
effort 
Bite, calcium, etc., by animals or 
humans 
-  Bite  
- Puncture by insects or fish  
- Shot, football, head, strangulation  
- Another case relating to bite, kick, etc., by 
animals or humans 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This work has made it possible to create valid instruments for the analysis and prevention 
of accidents. These instruments include: 
 A data collection questionnaire, which has allowed all the information necessary 
for the subsequent analysis of the chain of events  to be obtained; 
 A logical scheme that has led to knowledge on the chain of events responsible for 
an accident, but which, if followed backwards, can offer useful information for the 
prevention of such accidents; 
 A software program that allows the logical analysis scheme to be applied, thus 
simplifying the search for the causes and solutions that are necessary to interrupt 
the chain of events that trigger the accidental event. 
Although it is here important to reconfirm the concept that it is of utmost importance to 
act before anomalous events occur, rather than controlling their results, it is also true that 
an in-depth study, speeded up by a specific collection of information on the dynamics of 
an accident, is a useful source of indications of a technical, organizational and procedural 
nature which can be used to eliminate risks or, once the impossibility of doing so has been 
established, to reduce these risks.  
The subsequent introduction of such an instrument into the real working environment has 
made it possible to set up a suitable, efficacious and more rapid method than the one that 
is presently being used for the study of accidents, which is necessary for the protection of 
the safety and security of the working force. 
Remarkable efforts were necessary to reach this objective, first because the questionnaire 
required several revisions that were determined, now and again, on the basis of 
suggestions made after its use in the real situation of an emergency room, and then due 
to the difficulties involved in collecting the data because of the limited objective 
participation of the victims of accidents (who were in a difficult situation because of their 
not perfectly safe working environment). Finally, since the analysis of the accidents that 
occurred was particularly detailed, so that the results could offer useful information, 
particular efforts were again required. However, having detailed information on 
accidental events has surely made it possible to find the ideal format for the reporting of 
accidents and to establish precise indications on the dynamics that had led to the 
damaging event, in other words, to be able to acquire information that would otherwise 
be difficult to find in other documents. 
After the data had been collected, the next step was that of “processing” the thought 
behind the analysis, which can be illustrated through a logical diagram, into a real 
software program, which has allowed a suitable and efficacious tool to be created for the 
study of accidental events, which is necessary to guarantee the  safety and security of 
workers. 
It has in fact been the preventive aspect that has been given just relevance in this work.  
In fact, a meticulous prevention activity cannot be fully efficacious if attention is only 
focused on the last rings of the production chain; it is only by having the possibility of 
intervening on the real causes of an accident that the problem is resolved, but it is also 
necessary to investigate what has happened to find the correct remedies. 
The instruments proposed through this thesis, for example,  the data collection 
questionnaire, as far as the accident report model is concerned, is obviously meant for all 
users, while both the questionnaire, once filled in, and the investigation protocol are 
meant for competent users, such as UPG inspectors, INAIL or technical 
experts/consultants, in that the two complement each other, and the latter in particular 
requires the knowledge of “AND/OR” Boolean algebra, above all during the identification 
of the preventive measures, in order to obtain the best results. 
Finally, the application of such powerful tools makes it possible to assert that a further 
step towards the safeguarding of the health and safety of workers is surely possible, even 
in those countries, such as in Italy, where the technological and industrialized level is 
extremely high and complex. 
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Appraisals and Consulting of C.T. P.M. 
Summary of accident events analyzed in detail 
 
 
 
